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SOMMAIRE
La lecture heideggerienne de Nietzsche comme voie d’accès à son
interprétation de la technique moderne.
Chacun sait que Martin Heidegger a donné une série de cours sur la philosophie
de friedrich Nietzsche. Dans ces cours, Heidegger s’engage dans ce qu’il a
appelé une Auseinanderseizung avec Nietzsche. Cette confrontation et remise en
question de soi face à Nietzsche est riche en développements. D’un côté, elle
montre Heidegger comme un des plus passionnés et persévérants interprètes de
Nietzsche du vingtième siècle. Ainsi, Heidegger parvient à systématiser la
pensée de Nietzsche en montrant une unité intrinsèque entre la volonté de
puissance et l’éternel retour du même. D’un autre côté, l’Auseinandersetzung
heideggerienne avec Nietzsche permet à Heidegger de trouver son propre
vocabulaire en ce qui concerne un thème important de sa deuxième philosophie:
l’essence de la technique moderne.
Le but de notre mémoire est de faire ressortir les deux aspects mentionnés
ci-dessus de la lecture heideggerienne de Nietzsche. Nous tâchons d’élucider en
quoi consiste l’unité de la volonté de puissance et de l’éternel retour et comment,
à partir de cette unité, Heidegger est parvenu à développer une interprétation
englobante de l’essence de la technique moderne. Enfin, nous voudrions attirer
l’attention sur ce que nous pensons être un lien négligé par Heidegger dans sa
lecture de Nietzsche: le rapport entre l’éternel retour et les thèmes de la
transcendance et de la liberté.
Mots-clés: philosophie, métaphysique, ontologie, Nietzsche, Heidegger.
ABSTRACT
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche as a point of access to bis
interpretation of modem technology
As is well-known, Martin Heidegger provided a series of lecture-courses on the
philosophy ofFriedrich Nietzsche. In those courses, Heidegger engages himself
in what he has called an Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche. This confrontation
and coming to terms with Nietzsche provides us with many insights. On the one
hand it makes ofHeidegger perhaps the most consummate and unrelentless
twentieth century reader ofNietzsche. Thus, Heidegger manages to systematize
Nietzsche’s thought by showing an muer unity between the will to power and the
eternal recunence of the same. On the other hand, Heidegger’ s
Auseinandersetziing allows him to find bis own vocabulary concerning an
important theme ofhis later philosophy: the essence of modem technology.
The aim ofthis thesis will be to elucidate Heidegger’s reading of
Nietzsche in both the senses outlined above. We will be interested in
investigating what the unity of the wilI to power and the etemal recurrence of the
same consists in and how, starting from this unity, Heidegger develops an
encompassing interpretation ofthe essence ofmodern technology. Lastly, we
wilÏ investigate what we believe is a neglected link by Heidegger in bis reading of
Nietzsche between eternal recurrence, transcendence and freedom.
Key-words : philosophy, metaphysics, ontology, Nietzsche, Heidegger.
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1INTRODUCTION
The subject of this thesis is to explore specific, yet crucial aspects of the
relationship between the thoughts of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. It will
focus more precisely on the problematic character of Heidegger’s interpretation of
Nietzsche. It can corne as no surprise that Martin Heidegger, one of the most important
thinkers of the past century, should have been fascinated with, and explored the thought
of one of lis most important and influential predecessors from the previous century,
Friedrich Nietzsche. Given Heidegger’s stature as a leading figure of 2Oth century
philosophy, his readers would expect important contributions from his delayed encounter
with the prophetically inclined Nietzsche.
Indeed, Heidegger provides a thoroughly docurnented body of work to
substantiate his views on Nietzsche and he atternpts to systematize Nietzsche’s thought
by placing the main rubrics of his thought in dialogue with the rest of the tradition that
begins with Plato and that constitutes the inception of Western thought. This is perhaps
what is most brilliant and compelling about Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche. The
aim of this thesis is to examine and set out how Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche is
the starting point from which he progressively developed a global interpretation of the
essence of modem technology. Starting from this interpretation, we will try to show that
Heidegger, in examining Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal recurrence of the same, has
made too little of the concepts of freedorn and transcendence. The relationship between
the Nietzschean rubrics identified by Heidegger and their function as technological
categories working and operating within Heidegger’s own project that attempts
to articulate the essence of modem technology has been most clearly explored by Reiner
Schuermann in Heidegger on Being and acting: From principles to anarchy. We wilI
examine, as part of our critical assessment, the tenability of Schuermann’s thesis that the
rubrics are indeed technological categories and that, although formally speaking of
Nietzsche, materially they articulate Heidegger’s views on the essence of modem
technology.
Despite the undisputable qualities of Heidegger’s reading and of his critique of
Nietzsche, which we take to culminate in his papers on technology, there remains a
residue of confrontation that Heidegger does not address in his engagement with
Nietzsche, stemming from what we perceive as certain insufficiencies in the
Heideggerian interpretation of Nietzsche, and which shah provide fertile ground for a
critique of Heidegger’s reading.
By ways of general background, it is perhaps useful for the reader to recahi that
Heidegger explored and deait with the philosophy of Nietzsche in the course of an
important series of lecture courses given at the uni versity of Freiburg during the years
1936-1940 (hereinafter referred to as the “Lectures”) and (b) an important number of
essays written between the years 1940-1946, which are included in the English
translations of the aforementioned Lectures. Therefore, and using these matenals as a
starting point, the topics explored in this thesis wihl be deait with in the fohlowing
sequence:
1) Firstly, we will begin by outiining the genesis and by providing a summary of
Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche using the chronology of the Lectures for the
purpose of which we shail consider not onÏy the Lectures as published in 1961, but also
their original version now published in the Gesamtausgabe. We will also consider
3Nietzsche ‘s word « God is dead », and Who is Nietzsche ‘s Zarathustra as welI as three
works which are fundamental to any grasping of the full breadth of Heidegger’s
Nietzsche interpretation, namely, Contributions to phitosophy (From the event), What is
catted thinking (the conference course) and Overcorning metaphysics.
2) Secondly, we will elaborate and criticize Heidegger’s position relating to the
unity of the Nietzschean concepts of the etemal recurrence of the same and the will to
power. We wiII expand on the way he appropriates and transforms these concepts into the
fundamental categories through which he articulates the essence of modem technology.
3) Thirdly, we wilI test the philological and conceptual rigor of Heidegger’s
reading, and in so doing we will focus on certain aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that are
arguably occluded or overshadowed in the Heideggerian reading. Here we wiIJ again
provide a summary of Heidegger ‘s reading of Nietzsche, one that focuses on the etemal
recurrence of the same. Specifically, we wiII daim that Heidegger lias perhaps under-read
the themes of freedom and transcendence in Nietzsche’s thought.
41 Genesis and summary of Heideg%er’s Nïetzsche interpretation
Heidegger bas a very distinct reading of Nietzsche. Although Heidegger provides
a great deal of textual evidence in order to substantiate bis views, there is something
strange about the way he interprets Nietzsche. Perhaps the problem with Heidegger’s
reading is that he tries to systematize Nietzsche’s thought in a way qui te foreign to
Nietzsche. In fact, Nietzsche neyer thought very highly of systems and systematizers:
“I mistrust ail systematizers and avoid them. The will to
system is a lack of integrity.”
(Twilight of the Idols, “Maxims and Arrows”, 26)
Nevertheless Heidegger’s reading acquires strength because he manages to show
convincing links between Nietzsche’s notions of wilI to power, (iberrnensch, eternal
recurrence, nihilism and justice.
This section will be organized around what Heidegger bas identified as the five
main rubrics of Nietzsche’s thought: will to power, Ueberrneizsch, etemai recurrence,
nihilism and justice. Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche evolves across the four lecture-
courses: The witt to power as art (N I), Eternat recurrence ofthe saiiie (N II), The wilt
to power as knowtedge and as metapïzysics (N III) and Nihitisrn (N IV). Sections 1.1,
1.2., 1.3 and 1.4 of this essay correspond roughly to a summaries of the first, second,
third and fourth Lectures, respectively. Section 1.5 (Heidegger’s interpretation of
Nietzsche’s concept of the Ueberinensch) does not correspond to any Lecture in
particular but is rather inspired by the rubric corresponding to the Uebennensch in the
treatise Nietzsche ‘s metaphysics and by the essay Who is Nietzsche ‘s Zarathustra. In
5general, even though the sections 1.1-1.4 in my essay correspond roughly to the material
in the four lecture courses, I have also focused on the essays (Who is Nietzsche ‘s
Zarathustra, NietzscÏze ‘s rnetaphysics and NietzscÏze ‘s word « God is dead » from the
HoÏzwege). In this respect, it is my opinion that the treatise Nietzsche ‘s metaphysics is
perhaps the most unitary and coherent way of approaching the five rubrics of Nietzsche’s
thought given the evolving nature of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche in the four lecture
courses. Thus, I have also completed my summaries of the Lectures by making explicit
reference to that essay.
The summarizing of Heidegger ‘s four lecture courses, allows us to introduce the
subject matter and the way Heidegger interprets Nietzsche’s philosophy. It’s a necessary
«entrée en matière » that wilI allow us to build up to and examine, in section two, the
daim that Heidegger uses bis reading of Nietzsche to develop an encompassing
interpretation of the essence of modem technology.
1.1 Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power and its
relationship to art
The purpose of this first part of our summary of Heidegger’s Nietzsche
interpretation is, among others, to present the concept of the will to power as art as
expounded in Heidegger’s first lecture titled Will to power as art. In addition, we shah
use this exercise as an opportunity to explore the notions of will to power, art, truth, life,
rapture and art in the grand style both with respect to their relevance in Nietzsche’s
philosophy and as Heidegger summarizes them and re-articulates them. Furthermore, we
6shah endeavor to explain how Heidegger understands the concept of the wihl to power in
its relationship to the way Nietzsche views art. More generally we shah attempt to
present the wihl to power as both a condition of preservation and enhancement of life and
as the Being of beings. The first characterization is pureiy Nietzschean aithough on the
whole it is accepted by Heidegger. The second characterization is more Heideggerian,
although Nietzsche does daim that the «innermost essence of Being is will to power»
(Will to power 693, March-June 1888. The daim is made as a hypothesis, but there is
room to believe that Nietzsche supports the hypothesis as being true.).
In order to ciarify Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power and how it functions in
helping Heidegger articulate his reading of the essence of modem technology, we have
to define the notion of the wili to power. This notion is made up of some fundamental
aspects. These aspects are truth, play of forces, conditions of enhancement and
preservation, life and art. In order to understand how and whether the notion of the wihi
to power functions as a technological category (by becoming in Heidegger’s language the
will-to-wili, which characterizes the essence of modem technoiogy), we have to ciarify
how it is presupposed through ail of the aspects previously mentioned. It is necessary to
understand that what we are doing here is both giving a summary of the lecture of WiÏl to
power as art and trying to understand why for Heidegger, Nietzsche couid be
satisfactorily systematized under the five rubrics of wilI to power, etemai recurrence,
nihihism, justice and Uebennensch. We are examining throughout this thesis, the daim
that, even though Nietzchean in origin, these rubrics, articulated and systematized by
Heidegger, become totahly appropriated by Heidegger, and to the point that Heidegger
extracts from them the vocabulary to articulate his conception of the essence of modem
7technoÏogy.
It must be noted that the thesis that Nietzsche articulates the essence of modem
technology is doubled up with another Heideggerian thesis that Nietzsche is the last
metaphysician of the West. According to this thesis, Nietzsche closes the circle of
Western metaphysics. Nietzsche’s inverted platonism would constitute the completion of
a metaphysical project begun by Plato. In order to begin to show that Nietzsche
completes and inverts Plato’ s metaphysics, Heidegger finds inverted statements about art
and truth in Nietzsche and Plato respectively. Even though Nietzsche himself says that
lis phulosophy is an inverted Platonism, he believes that he overcomes and goes beyond
Plato. However, Heidegger daims that, in fact, Nietzsche neyer goes beyond Plato and
that he remains trapped within metaphysics and within an inverted platonizing
metaphysics. So even though Nietzsdhe daims that he is critical of and in fact breaks
beyond metaphysics, and even though he lias certain concepts which to some extent we
believe do in fact achieve this break with metaphysics, Heidegger does provide
convincing arguments in support of lis position that by simply reversing platonism
(which is not co-extensive with platonic metaphysics), Nietzsche does flot in fact
overcome but simply completes the Western metaphysical tradition.
The completion ofthe Western metaphysical tradition is connected with the more
far-reaching thesis that the NietzscheanfHeideggerian mbrics articulate the essence of
modem technology insofar as Nietzsche’ s metaphysics is both the last metaphysics of the
West and the consummation ofmetaphysics into the essence of modem technology.
There is a diachrony, a double effect of temporal correspondence and non
correspondence, here, insofar as the last metaphysics (Nietzsche’ s) and technology as
8the metaphysics of our time both coïncide and distinguish themseives.
I will try to indicate as much as possible what Heidegger says about Nietzsche’s
philosophy when these daims are flot obvious from a Nietzschean point of view.
Heidegger believes Nietzsche to be a thinker of a single thought. For him, this single
thought is the thought of the will to power as what constitutes the basic character of
beings’ (Heidegger, Nietzsche I, p.3, Farrell-KreIl translation). Furthermore, Heidegger
daims that Nietzsche is «a thinker who says that ail being is ultimately will to power ».
In order to show that the will to power is Nietzsche’s single thought, Heidegger
notoriously decides to focus his reading on the posthumously published Witt to power.
Heidegger begins by stating that will and power are, for Nietzsche, two aspects of
the same thing. Will is something which seeks to increase itseif, to overcome itseif. Will
always wiiis to be more. Similarly, power is something which is inherentiy oriented
towards its own enhancement. Power is viscerally oriented towards more power, towards
its own expansion. As Heidegger puts it:
Jedes Woilen ist ein Mehr-sein-Woiien. Macht selbst ist
nur, sofem sie und solange sie ein Mehr-sein-Woilen bieibt.
Sobald dieser Wille aussetzt, ist Macht schon nicht mehr
Macht, wenngleich sie das Beherrschte noch in der Gewait
hat.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche j, Wille zur Macht ais Kunst, S.72)
Every wiiling is a wanting-to-be-more. Power itseif only
exists insofar and as long as it remains a wanting—to-be
more. As soon as this wiliiing ceases, power is no longer
power even if it stiil has what it commands under its
control (My translation, P.C.).
‘Heidegger, Nietzsche 1, p4, Farrell-KrelI translation.
Whether Nietzsche’s one and essential thought is the wilI to power or the eternal recurrence of the same is
flot altogether clear in Heidegger’s work. There does seem to be a stronger emphasis on the eternal
recurrence of the same as Heidegger’s interpretation progresses. In Was Izeisst Denken, it seems like the
9It is important to understand that for Heidegger, the will to power, which he interprets as
the concept of being, is an ontological notion. Insofar as Heidegger wishes to
understand the will to power both as an ontological notion and as Nietzsche’s one and
only thought, he must, to a certain extent, reduce Nietzsche’s thought to ontology. But
it is flot obvious that this can be done without disregarding important aspects of
Nietzsche’s thought. I will retum later to this possible criticism of Heidegger’s reading.
Thus, for Heidegger, will to power is the ontological concept of the Being of
beings2. Quoting Nietzsche, Heidegger daims: «Will to power is the ultimatefacturn to
which we come ». Heidegger deals with the relationship between truth, art and will to
power in the thought of Nietzsche. In order to deal with truth, art and will to power in the
philosophy of Nietzsche, Heidegger implicitly understands the relationship between the
fundamental concepts that are life, truth and will to power in Nietzsche’s philosophy as
discussed hereafter. The will to power is conceptually Iinked to truth and wilI to truth.
For Nietzsche, truth exists only insofar as it is posited by the will to power. Truth is a
vital error. It is the type of error without which human beings cannot live. This leads to
the discussion of what Nietzsche means by life.
Nietzsche’s concept of tife is closeÏy related to will and power. Life should not be
understood as the set of properties in virtue of which certain entities are said to be alive.
For Nietzsche, life is something more organic and much akin to the will to power. Life
is characterized as a multiplicity of forces (Witl to power, 641). This multiplicity of
forces is a play of forces. This play of forces constitutes life and it cannot in the last
eternal recurrence has attained a certain preeminence over the wilI to power.
2 (See Schuermann’s book Heidegger on Being and acting: Froin principtes to anarchy, chapter: Ii
retrospecti ve categories, for reference)
XVI, 415, quoted by Heidegger, p. 3, Nietzsche, Vol. I, Farell-KreIl translation.
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analysis be grounded orjustified. Inherent to the notion of life is value-positing. Each
form of life which is the result of a play of forces, establishes certain values that are
posited in such a way as to preserve and enhance that forrn of life. Heidegger daims that
conditions of enhancernent are always at the same tirne conditions of preservation of life.
(N 11, 268, German version).
Nietzsche daims that forces interact, struggie with each other and corne to a
certain equilibrium. But this equilibrium is epherneral and to think of it as something
etemal arnounts to deceiving oneseif. The equilibrium is destroyed anew by the
appearance of different configurations of forces. Because of changes occurring in the
4
configurations of forces, new struggies ensue. (Wttl to power, 1067)
Therefore, we understand the will to power as this movement of beings whereby
they engage in struggles with each other. The struggie cornes about because each being,
as an instantiation of the will to power wants to enhance itself and becorne rnore
powerful. Truth is the apparent equilibrium reached by the forces in their struggie with
one another. According to Nietzsche, the philosophical tradition has named truth this
apparent equilibrium, this petrifaction of the perspectival, force-laden interpretations of
things. For Nietzsche truth «is a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphisms
-- in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced,
transposed, and ernbellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem
firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has
forgotten that is what they are; metaphors which are wom out and without sensuous
power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as
Art and suffering are said to increase the feeling, the intensity of life. Heidegger insists on the fact that
Nietzsche’s talk of life is sometimes misleadingly biological and thus Ieads to a misunderstanding of
11
coins.”(On truth and lie in an extra-moral sense, The Viking Portable Nietzsche, p.46-7,
Waiter Kaufmann translation )5
Truth certainiy plays an important role in Nietzsche’s phiiosophy, since it
amounts to the preservation of certain interpretations and hence to the preservation of life
(through value-positing). However, according to Nietzsche preservation is not the most
important drive of beings understood as wiII to power. On the contrary, beings aiways
want to enhance and overcome themseives. k is important to understand that Nietzsche’s
notion of the play of forces does flot appiy only to the relationship that exists between
beings. Rather, the play of forces is both interior and exterior to beings. It govems not
only the relationship between beings as such, but it occurs also within each and every
being. Even more, it could be said, but this is Heidegger’s expression and no longer
Nietzsche’s that the will to power qua play of forces is the ground of appearance of ail
beings.6
Having exposed Nietzsche’s concept of truth, we can introduce now the relation
of art and truth in Nietzsche’s work, as understood by Heidegger. Nietzsche’s statement
that «art is worth more than truth » (Will to power, 853, IV) is seen by Heidegger as
staking a counter-position, an inversion that closes the circle of Piato’s metaphysics.7
Heidegger understands this statement by Nietzsche in connection with Nietzsche’s daim
Nietzsche’s rnetaphysics. It leads to what Nietzsche hirnself has called a Physiologie der Kunst.
This is precisely the aspect of Nietzsche’s thought that cornes into conflict with the tradition and
specifically with Hegel. For Hegel, it is the nature of language and art that it allows for preservation
(Aufitebung) of certain universal notions. These universal notions are aiways concretely instantiated in what
Hegel calis the infinite/finite totality.
6 This Heideggerian way of putting the problern is probably indebted to Kant: the wiIl to power as the
condition of possibility of appearance of objects.
Heidegger, Nietzsche, VoI.2, p.205, Farell-KreIl translation.
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that his philosophy is an inverted Platonism.8 According to Heidegger, Nietzsche’ s
statement that art is worth more than truth must find its inverse in Plato.9 This opposition
between Nietzsche’ s position and Plato’ s Ieads Heidegger to say that Nietzsche is the last
metaphysician, and that in his philosophy metaphysics consummates itself into
technology which itselfbecomes the metaphysics of our time.
In Plato’s Phaedrus, Heidegger finds the inverted relationship between art and
truth that he is looking for. According to Plato, beauty is what first introduces human
beings to the supersensible. Aesthetic experience works as a catalyst for the
contemplation oftruth. However, once human beings have contemplated the
supersensible thereby discovering the pleasures oftmth, beauty becomes secondary. The
supersensible as the locus of tmth takes precedence over the sensuous as the locus of the
beautiful.
Nietzsche considers Plato’ s understanding of the relationship between art and
tmth as essentially flawed because it is based on a valuation of the supersensible, over
and above the sensible. Indeed, we would expand on this daim by adding that for
Nietzsche, this higher valuation ofthe supersensible and the positing of categories of
reason that are grounded in the supersensible reaim is nihilistic.’° While Nietzsche’s use
ofthe word “nihilism” is in itself a complicated issue, in this context it can be taken to
mean <fagainst life»12. Accordingly, the platonic higher valuation ofthe supersensibte
8 (Meine Philosophie, umgedrehter Platomsmus, Kritische Gesarntausgabe, 3 roman numemi, 3:7 [156]).
Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. 1, P. 18$, Farell-Krell translation.
10 Nietzsche, Witt to power, Section 12.
12 is complicated because Nietzsche distinguishes between at least two senses of nihilism: an active
mhilism and a passive one. Nietzsche associates passive mhilism with decadence whereas active nihilism
is a way of overcoming decadence and going beyond the affection that is constituted by mhilism.
Heidegger distinguishes between at least five meanings ofnihilism: mhilism proper, classical mhilism, the
essence of mhilism, ecstatic nihilism,and incomplete mhilism. Nihilism proper seems to be what
13
reaim is against life because it cannot account for life’s play of forces that takes place in
the sensible reaim. Plato’s higher valuation of the supersensibie rejects the bodily, finite
existence of the senses in favor of an ascetic contemplation of the ideas. In this platonic
move, Nietzsche sees the roots of the Christian world-view that he so strongly criticizes
throughout his oeuvre. The notion of the supersensible reaim is itself a fabrication, which
is based on the perspectival aspect of life. This is the case because one perspective
among many is setected, evaluated and posited as above and beyond ail other
perspectives that life makes available to us. For Nietzsche, insofar as Plato and the
tradition have associated truth to the supersensible realm, they have been deceitful
fabricators and have misunderstood or disregarded the instinctual and playful aspect of
life.13
There are two further aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation upon which I would
like to focus: art as the grand style and art as rapture. I choose to discuss these concepts
briefly because they are very important for Nietzsche’s understanding of the will to
Heidegger the position associated with Nietzsche’s philosophy. Incomplete nihiiism foilows (logicaliy and
chronologically) nihilism proper and consists in the fact that even though the highest values have become
invaiid, there is an attempt made to revalorize them in the same supersensible locus where they had been
situated before. In this sense, ciassical nihilism goes beyond incompiete nihilism and constitutes a type of
“completion” and overcoming of that position. Classical nihilism is also associated to Nietzsche’s
philosophy and corresponds to a way out of nihilism through the position of values (Umwertung aile
bisherigen Werte, see Holzwege, S.208). The essence of nihiiism constitutes Heidegger’s own
appropriation of nihilism for the purposes of articuiating his own project. Nihilism constitutes according to
this reading the inner iaw of history and of the history of Being. The main principle of this history of Being
is the fact that in it Being is forgotten and “there is nothing to Being”.
13 The higher vaiuation of the supersensuous is nihilistic for political reasons as well as metaphysical ones:
it is against the iife of the here and now because it daims that this iife can only be understood through
principles that transcend it and by the contemplation of something that turns us away from this world. But
this also means that we do flot need to concern ourselves with the concrete empirical, economic, political
situations that we find ourseives in. In short, the piatonic move seems to be a form of escapism but a
dangerous one since it iimits the potentialities of enhancement and growth of an embodied humanity that is
grounded and involved in a multipiicity of immanent situations. It might be argued that this is not the case
from the Platonic perspective. “Seeing the idea” might preciseiy be according to this metaphysical
perspective the ultimate fuifillment and attainment that can be achieved by human beings.
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power and of art. However, upon close examination, these concepts do flot allow us to
bridge to Heidegger’s interpretation of modem technology. An oversimplification might
allow us to draw superficiai links (such as a connection between enhancement, will to
power and rapture, and a connection between eternal recurrence, preservation and grand
style), but a deeper analysis shows these connections to be spurious.
Nietzsche first introduces rapture in connection with the Dionysian aspect of
creation in Die Geburt der Tragoedie. At first, Dionysian rapture is opposed and
contrasted to the Apollonian aspect of creation.’4 The Dionysian is the chaotic,
destructive frenzy in which the artist finds himself during the primordial act of creation.
The Apollonian on the other hand is also associated to a state of the creating artist.15 This
is a cool, ethereal, dream-like state. It is the state associated with vision and the sun. In
this state, the artist sees the necessity of his creation clearly and distinctly. In the
Apollonian, the maddened frenzy of mystical revelation is no longer present: there is
rather a cairn certainty as to what the work of art ought to be and how its essence must be
articulated.’6
Heidegger calis rapture the fundarnental aesthetic state or rnood and views it as
fundamental to Nietzsche’s thought on art. It also plays a key role in the rest of lis
philosophy. We would expand on Heidegger’s daim, by adding that, in fact for
Nietzsche, it is through rapture (Rausch in German) that man realizes the Dionysian
aspects of existence.’7 In rapture, man is taken beyond himself and witnesses the
transfiguration of what is. It is through the experience of rapture that the thought of
L4 Nietzsche, Birtit of tragedy, Section 1.
Nietzsche, Birth oftragedy, Section 2.
16 Nietzsche, Birth oftragedy, Section 1.
17 Nietzsche, Witl to power, Section 798.
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etemal recurrence is granted. Through rapture man realizes that both he and the world are
nothing but will to power’8. Finally, it is through the affect of rapture that man realizes
that at the highest peak of meditation, existence, truth and art are impermanent and
transient falsifications, holy lies. Thus, we believe that Heidegger is right to daim that
rapture is a fundamental aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy, one that encompasses his
philosophy wholly and is who]Ïy encompassed by it.
As mentioned above, according to Heidegger, another fundamental aspect of
Nietzsche’s aesthetic is what he cails art in the grand style (Grosse Stit). 19 Creation in the
grand style is the supreme state of aesthetic rapture. In this act of creation, the will
legislates and produces form out of the chaos of existence21. We should flot understand
this willing of chaos into form only as a voluntarisic act of the artist to extend his rational
dominion over chaos. If that were the case, then Nietzsche would be repeating the
“mistake” of Cartesian metaphysics only, in a different domain: that of the aesthetic.
The artist does not want to make his creation etemal by giving it a form that transcends
the chaotic and perspectival aspect of life. If that were the case, he would be nothing
different from those fraudulous, yet brilliant metaphysicians who thought of Being and
truth as immutable and etemal. This would be to misunderstand Nietzsche’s conception
of being.
The problem is that the distinction between the categories of being and becoming
does flot seem sufficient to fully capture the notion of the grand style. In order to give a
18
“-This world is the wiIl to power and —and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to
power- and nothing besides”( Witt to power, Friedrich Nietzsche, Section 1067)
‘ Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 1, p.124’ Farell-KrelI translation.
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fuller characterization of the grand style, Heidegger appeals to the distinction between
two types of artist: the active and the reactive. This distinction is examined in
Heidegger’s treatment of Nietzsche’s position vis-à-vis Romantic art and Classical art.
Ail that needs to be added is that both Romantic art and Classical art can be nihilistic i.e.
against life. In other words, a form of art might glorify being because it is incapable of
willing a revaluation of ail values. It seeks to preserve what is, the status quo not out of
an overpowering feeling of life and health but precisely because it fears change and is
incapable of going beyond itself. In that sense even classical art may be nihilistic. Thus,
what is at stake is not whether being versus becoming is favored in a form of art but
whether that form of art is life-affirming or not.
There are two more aspects that we need to focus on. First, it is the connection of
the “grand style” to Nietzsche’s aesthetics and metaphysics. What is of relevance for
Heidegger is the fact that in the “grand style” although Nietzsche seems to be describing
aesthetical phenomena, he actually reaches into the core of his metaphysics22. This is the
case because Nietzsche has to faIl back upon a discussion of Being and Becoming, action
and reaction that are essentially metaphysical concepts.
finally, the “grand style” is essentially related to the concept of mastery that is
associated to the concepts of will to power and Uebennenscïz. As Heidegger puts it:
The grand style is the way in which will to power from the start dictates
the arrangement of ail things and the breeding of mankind as the mastery
of essentially end-less beings as a whole, subjecting them to its own
power, and on this basis overpowering in its ongoing enhancement.
Metaphysically considered, such dominating mastery over the earth is the
absolute permanentizing of the whole of Becoming
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Sec.5, p.232, Farell-Krell translation)
22
“When we are abie to survey what Nietzsche thinks and demands with regard to the grand style, oniy
then have we arrived at the peak of bis ‘aesthetics’ which at that point is no longer aesthetics at ail”
(Heidegger,Nietzsche,Vol.1, Sec. I7,p.1 37,Farell-Kreli translation)
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This section bas presented the concept of the will to power as art and as metaphysical
concept both as it is expounded in Nietzsche’s first lecture called Witt to power as art and
with reference to it as a rubric in Heidegger’s text Nietzsche’s metaphysics. It bas tried to
explain the concept of the will to power in its relationship to the way Nietzsche views art.
More generally it bas tried to articulate the wilI to power as both condition of
preservation and enhancement of tife and Being of beings.
1.2 Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s notion of eternal recurrence and its
relationship to the will to power.
This second part of our summary of Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation deals
with Heidegger’s analysis of Nietzsche’s etemal recurrence and its relationship to the wiII
to power, as expounded both in the Lecture given during the summer of the year 1937
called the EternaÏ recurrence ofthe saine, and in the summary of bis position given in
the essay Nietzsche ‘s metaphysics appended to the 1939 Lecture entitled the WiÏt to power
as Knowtedge. I will focus my exposition of Heidegger’s reading on both these texts.
The sections of the, Eternat recurrence oftÏze saiiie Lecture which we consider to be key
to summarizing Heidegger’s interpretation are sections 12, 13, and 14, and accordingly,
we bave focused our reading on them.
Heidegger ‘s examination of the concept of etemal recurrence is a crucial and
minutious exercise. He presents an exhaustive analysis of the different expositions of the
doctrine of eternal recurrence in the Nietzschean corpus. In addition, he also examines
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different sets ofunpublished fragments23. Neverthetess, his uttimate assessment with
respect to this doctrine can be easily summarized: Nietzsche’ s philosophy is, according to
Heidegger, flot only a metaphysical one, but, in fact, the last Western metaphysical
position and in the Nietzschean metaphysics the doctrine of eternal recurrence makes up
one aspect of what Heidegger cails Nietzsche’ s GrundsteïÏung (ffindamental position).
With respect to the concept of Grundstelhtng, we have to mention another project of
Heidegger’s called the Seinsgeschichte or histoiy ofBeing. The history ofBeing is a
concept in itself, that is complex, and that warrants a separate discussion on its own
terms. For our purposes we will state that this history corresponds or is made up ofthe
positions of certain key thinkers such as Ptato, the medieval scholastics, Leibniz,
Descartes, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and Nietzsche. To these key thinkers correspond
what Heidegger catis fundamental metaphysical positions (metaphysischen
GrundteÏlungen). A firndamental metaphysical position is characterized by the fact that
it answers what Heidegger calis the guiding question of philosophy (What are beings?) in
a specific and characteristic way. However, generally, the grounding question of
phulosophy (What is Being?) does flot get asked and is even occluded in the fundamental
metaphysical positions preceding Heidegger’s own phiÏosophy.
He examines the unpublished fragments from the period of the Gay Science, 1881-1882, from the
Zarathustra period 1883-1884 and ftom the period ofthe Will ta power, 1884-1888.
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Etemal recurrence of the same is, according to Heidegger, the supreme thought
of what he argues to be the metaphysics of Nietzsche:
It would scarcely be possible to say in a more Iucid fashion, first, how
and on what basis the stamping of Being on Becoming is meant to be
understood, and second, that the thought of etemal recurrence of the
same, even and precisely during the period when the thought of the will to
power appears to attain preeminence, remains the thought which
Nietzsche’s philosophy thinks without cease.
(Heidegger, Nietzscïze, Vol .2, Sec.26, p.203, FareII-Krell translation)
Heidegger’s interpretation is informed by how he sees the relationship between
Nietzsche’s will to power and the doctrine of etemal recurrence. In the following
paragraphs I will give an account of Heidegger’s reconstruction of Nietzsche’s proof of
eternal recurrence. This reconstruction is given by Heidegger in the essay called
Nietzsche’s nzetaphysics that is appended to the 1939 lecture course the Will to power as
Knowledge. This reconstruction is based on the fundamental unity that Heidegger sees at
work between will to power and etemal recurrence and that was alluded to earlier in this
section. Heidegger begins by stating that «the endless and etemally empowered
character of will to power is at the same time finite in its positions and configurations ».
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol 3, Sec.4, p.21 1 Farell-Krell translation.)
Since the positions and configurations of the will to power are finite there seems
to be a contradiction between the nature of the will to power and its embodiments. The
will to power strives for infinity in its desire to overcome itself but it always finds itself
in concrete and finite situations and hence is limited and finite. This tension is what
allows for the movement or the state of becoming to be associated with the will to power.
Each concrete position or configuration of the will to power must go under and transform
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itself into another radically different embodiment of the will to power. But this cannot go
on indefinitely. This is the case because the reserve of will to power (if one may call it
so) is in itself limited. Enhancement cannot go on forever. At this point Heidegger
quotes Nietzsche who says that:
The world as force dare flot be thought of as unbounded, for it cannot be
so thought of, we forbid ourselves the concept of an infinite force as
incompatible with the concept of ‘force’. Thus- the world also lacks the
capacity for etemal novelty. (WM,1062)
(Quoted by Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Sec.4, p.2l1, Fareli- Krell
translation ).
Heidegger goes on to give a pithy summary:
If being as such is will to power and thus etemat Becoming, and if will to
power demands end-lessness and (but, my parentheses, P.C.) exciudes
endless progress towards an end in itself; if at the same time the etemal
Becoming of will to power is delimited in its possible configurations and
constructs of domination, because it cannot be new unto infinity; then
being as a whole as will to power must permit the same to recur and be an
etemal recurrence of the same.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Sec.4, p.211, FarelI-Krell translation)
Heidegger gives a slightly different reconstruction of Nietzsche’s proof of etemal
recurrence in the lecture course of 193$ entitled The eternat recurrence ofthe sanie. This
reconstruction does flot focus so much on the notion of the will to power. However the
argument provided by Heidegger is not radically different from the one provided in the
1939 essay Nietzsche ‘s nzetaphysics and stated above. This is the case because the terms
becoming and will to power are quasi-synonyms in Heidegger’s reading ofNietzsche:
will to power is, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s original way of re-thinking the
concept of becoming.
In order to follow the proof more readily, it would be useful to recall a number of
theses that make up Nietzsche’s metaphysical understanding of the world according to
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Heidegger. These are metaphysical theses on the physico-cosmological nature of the
world that Heidegger identifies in the Nietzschean NacÏzlass. I will focus on only those
theses that I consider to be the most relevant:
1)The world’s pervasive character isforce.
2)The izature offorce is timited.
3)Because of]) and 2), the total ity ofthe world itsetf is deenzed to befinite.
4) There is no equilibrium state offorce and hence ofthe world.
5) Space is bounded wzdfinite.
6) In contrast to space, time is injînite.
7) The collective character of tÏze world is Chaos.
8) Cosmic Chaos is in itseÏfnecessity.24
We will now consider the Heideggerian reconstruction of etemal recurrence as provided
on p.l09 of Vol.2 of his Nietzsche lectures. Heidegger begins by asserting that the
general character of force yields the finitude of Being and its becoming. From this there
follows that the advance and progress of cosmic occurrence into infinity is impossible.
This in tum implies that the world’s becoming must tum back onto itself. But thesis 6)
implies that the world’s becoming runs backward and forward in endless (infinite) time
as real time. Thus the finite becoming which runs its course in such infinite time must
have achieved some kind of homeostasis or equilibrium since the finite possibilities of
becoming must be exhausted in the infinite flow of real time. Nietzsche daims (and
Heidegger repeats this argument) that since no such homeostasis has been achieved, this
means that no such state of equilibrium can ever be achieved. This implies that the world
24 (Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.2, Sec. 12, pp.$4-93, farell-Krell translation)
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is in permanent becoming : it tums back on itself and flows into an etemal becoming.
But since this cosmic becoming takes place continuously and does flot cease whenever its
finite possibilities are exhausted this impiies that it must have repeated itself and that this
repetition has occurred an infinite number times. Since this becoming is permanent it
will continue to repeat itself in the future. But since the world totality is finite in the
configurations of its becoming as asserted in thesis 3) the possibilities of transformation
in its collective character are finite as well. Because the nexus of effects among the
various processes of becoming is a ciosed nexus, every single process of becoming must
draw the entire past in its wake. Altematively, since the process of becoming works its
effects ahead, it must propel ail things forward. This in turn implies that every process
of becoming must reproduce itself. Thus the etemal recurrence of the totality of world
becoming must be a recurrence of the same.25
Another aspect that we need to focus on is the thought of etemal recurrence as
what Heidegger calls the constantification of the constant. This aspect of the thought is
briefly mentioned in the essay Nietzsche ‘s metaphysics. The idea seems to be that etemal
recurrence stands in contradistinction to the will to power which is a new way for
Nietzsche to think becoming. In this sense etemal recurrence of the same allows beings
to corne to presence: it provides the constant framework within which beings can corne to
25 How does the previous dialectic of the wilI to power and eternal recurrence t because that’s the way
Heidegger treats it, in dialectical fashion, which in itself might be a distorsion of Nietzsche’s thought) fit in
with the Nietzschean argument that there cannot be an equilibrium in the state of the world quoted by
Heidegger in vol.I (German):
I) if there had been a state of equilibrium in the world it would have been reached by now
II) it has not been reached ( What kind ofcriteria need to be applied here logical, phenomenological,
scientifico-empirical ‘?) hence
III) there cannot be such a state of equilibrium ?
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appear26. Heidegger asserts that:
Being and Becoming are only apparently in opposition because the
character of Becoming in will to power is in its innermost essence eternal
recurrence of the same and thus the constant permanentizing of the
unstable.
(Heidegger, NietzscÏze, Vol.3, Sec.4, p.2l3, Farell-Krell translation)
This aspect of eternal recurrence does flot seem to be involved directly in the proof of
etemal recurrence that is given by Heidegger.
I would like to focus on a few more points in this section. First, I would like to
discuss the temporality of etemaÏ recurrence. Etemal recurrence is instantaneous i.e. it
occurs in the temporality of the moment. However recurrence can also be thought of as
the synthesis in a moment of the temporality of being (etemity) and becoming (instant).
We believe this affords the thought of etemal recurrence a dialectical quality that is flot
present in most of Nietzsche’s other concepts. This is flot an obvious Heideggerian
reading of the thought of recurrence. This is rather my own reading of eternal recurrence
and I will develop it more in the second part of this paper. There is however in the
Heideggerian text evidence for this reading and I will shortly expose it here. Two main
quotes substantiate this reading:
The ‘momentary’ character of creation is the essence of actual, actuating
eternity, which achieves its greatest breadth and keenest edge as the
moment of etemity.
(Heidegger, NietzscÏze, Voi.2, Sec.26, p.203, Farell-Krell translation)
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“Eternal recun-ence of the sarne is the way in which the impermanent (that which becomes) as such
cornes to presence; it cornes to presence in the highest form of perrnanence (in circling), with the sole
deterrnination ofsecuring its possibility to be ernpowered.”(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3 p.2l2, fareil
Krell translation)
and
“The sarne that recurs has only relative stability and is therefore essentially unstable. Its recurrence
however, signifies a continuai bringing back into stability, that is, a permanentizing. Eternal recurrence is
the rnost constant permanentizing of the unstable”
(Heidegger, Niet.sche, Vol.3 p.2l2, FarelI-Krell translation).
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But will to power is as eternal recurrence. In the latter Nietzsche wants
his thinking to fuse Being and Becoming, action and reaction in an
original unity.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.1, Sec. 17, p.1 36, Fareii-Krell translation)
The question of the temporaiity of recurrence is related to the problem of transcendence.
Again this is my reading of etemal recurrence and it does flot belong in this section but
rather in the critical section. I will just state that I read recurrence in a different way than
it is normally understood and that I see a dialectic of transcendence and immanence
operating in Nietzsche’s thought, something that has not been identified by any of the
commentators that I am familiar with. The traditional reading of recurrence sees it as
evacuating ail trace of transcendence from the world. On this reading, etemal recurrence
consists rather in restoring the full immanence to the world that has been occluded by
traditional metaphysics. More will be said in the critical section of this paper. But again
Heidegger’s text presents some evidence for my reading. (Since the translation from the
German is difficuit, I include both versions of this passage):
Dieses Seiendwerden aber wird zum werdenden Seienden im staendigen
Werden des Festgewordenen ais eines Erstarrten zum festgemachten ais
der befreienden Verklaerung.
What is and what becomes are fused in the fundamental thought that what
becomes is inasmuch as in creation it becomes being and is becoming.
But such becoming-a-being becomes a being that comes-to-be, and does
so in the perpetual transformation of what has become firmly fixed and
intractable to something made firm in a liberating transfiguration.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.2, Sec.26, p.200, Farell-Krell translation)
The last topic that I would like to focus on is how Heidegger treats the thought of
eternal recurrence of the same in relation to the concept of freedom. Heidegger begins by
asserting that the thought of etemal recurrence leads us back to the problem of freedom
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and necessity (Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.2, Sec. 1$, p.133, Farell-Krell translation)
But very bluntiy, Heidegger questions the fact that the thought of etemal recurrence
might be subordinated to the problem offreedom and necessity:
Yet so much is clear : the doctrine of retum should neyer be contorted in
such a way that it fits into the readily available ‘antinomy’ of fteedom and
necessity. At the same time, this reminds us once again of our sole task-to
think this most difficuh thought as it demands to be thought, on its own
terms, leaving ail supports and makeshifis.
(p138, Sec.l8, Vol.2, Nietzsche, Heidegger)
Heidegger does flot really provide an argument for why the thought ofrecurrence should
not be thought in relation to the problem offteedom and necessity. I will argue in the
second part ofthis paper that the connection to fteedom and necessity is precisely what
makes the thought ofetemal recurrence so important for Nietzsche’s philosophy.
However, at this point in the paper, t only wanted to expose Heidegger’s view ofetemal
recuilence.
Some new developments with respect to Nietzsche’s thought as a whole and with
respect to the thought of eternal recurrence can be detected in the 1951-52 lecture course
Was heisst Denken? In that course, Heidegger finally arrives at the core of the
Nietzschean doctrine of etemal recurrence ofthe same. Heïdegger also understands that
Nietzsche’s fundamental, essential, single thought is that ofeternal recurrence ofthe
same as opposed to that ofwill to power. (See note 24 for complete reference).
Heidegger also arrives at the conclusion that it is Nietzsche’ s ultimate, metaphysical goal
to redeem man from the spirit of revenge. The spirit of revenge is essentially
metaphysical and is understood in terms ofthe thought of etemal recurrence ofthe same.
The spirit of revenge is characterized as « the will’ s iII wilI (Des WiÏÏens WidenviÏÏe)
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against time and its « it was » ». Taking this characterization as the essence of eternal
recurrence of the same, Heidegger goes on to reconstruct the argument of eternai
recurrence in a way that is totaliy original with respect to his 1936-37 lectures. I wiii
attempt to convey this reconstruction here. Heidegger first proceeds by ctairning that
Nietzsche thinks revenge oniy from the Being of beings. In order to make good on this
daim, Heidegger examines how the Being of beings has been thought of in German
Tdealisrn, more particulariy in Scheiling. Thus the important quote that Heidegger
examines cornes from Scheliing’s 1809 Phitosophical Investigation Concerning the
Nature ofHuman Freedom and its Object:
In the final and highest instance, there is no being other than willing.
Willing is primal being and to it (willing) belong ail (primal being’s)
predicates being unconditioned, eternity, independence of tirne, self-
affirmation. Ail philosophy strives only to find this highest expression.
(Quoted by Heidegger in What is catted tÏtinking, pp.90-9l. I believe
parentheses to be Heidegger’s addition)
Heidegger ernphasizes that the word « wiiiing » does not rnean a capacity of the human
soui but that wiiiing designates the Being of beings as a whoie. Heidegger then daims
that Leibniz with his notion of perceptio and appetitus was already thinking of Being as
wiiiing. In Heidegger’s own words:
What Leibniz thought is then expressed by Kant and Fichte as the rational
will which Hegei and Schelling each in his own way, reflect upon.
Schopenhauer narnes and intends the same thing when he thinks of the
world as will and idea; and Nietzsche thinks the same thing when he
defines the primal nature of beings as will to power. (WÏzat is catted
thinking, p.91)
The reconstruction of a proof of etemal recurrence of the same is flot conducted along the
sarne unes as in the 1936-37 lectures. This time the « proof» of etemal recurrence is
conducted through an examination of the notion of will and how it relates to tirne. At
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crucial moments in the reconstruction Heidegger introduces telle quelle Schelling ‘s
thesis that will is primal being. This makes the nature of this proof highly problematic.
This is the case because Nietzsche was highly suspïcious of both the concepts of wilI and
Being. This can be readily demonstrated. Nevertheless, at this point, we choose to
follow the Heideggerian argument in its intricacy if only to better unhinge it later.
Heidegger begins by asserting that the will becomes free from what revoits it
when it becomes free as wiII, that is, free for the going in the passing away-but the kind
of going that does flot get away from the will, but comes back, bringing back what is
gone. (WÏzat is called thinking, p.104 )
This is the first step in his reconstruction of the « proof » of etemal recurrence. In
a second step Heidegger daims that the will becomes free from what is revolting in the
«It was » when it wills the constant recurrence of every « It was ». Heidegger further
asserts that the will wills its own eternity.(What is catled tÏzinking, p104) But then at a
crucial moment in the argument Heidegger introduces Schelling’s daim (flot shared by
Nietzsche according to me, for reasons I will shortly provide) that will is primal being.
From this Heidegger not only concludes his own version of the statement of recurrence
that « the primal being of Beings is the will, as the etemally recurrent willing of the
eternal recurrence of the same » but also the thesis that « The etemal recurrence of the
same is the supreme triumph of the metaphysics of the will that etemally wills its own
willing» (WÏzat is catled thinking, p.l04)
For Heidegger, will to power and eternal recurrence are inherently related in that
they both pertain to what he calls the beingness of beings (Sein des Seienden)
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.2, Sec.26, p.199, Farell-Krell translation). In essence, the
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will to power represents the quod ( the what, Was-sein) ofbeings. It is the constitution
(Verfassung) ofbeings. Beings are, according to their essence, according to how they are
constituted, will to power. On the other hand, the way in which beings are, their
quornodo (Dass-Sein, way ofbeing, way to be) is etemal recurrence. In Heidegger ‘s
own words:
Accordingly, in Nietzsche’s phllosophy will to power and eternal
recurrence ofthe same belong together. It is thus right from the start a
misunderstanding —better an outright mistake- ofmetaphysical proportions
when commentators tly to play off will to power against eternal recurrence
of the same, and especiaÏly when they exciude the latter altogether from
metaphysical determinations ofbeing. In truth, the coherence ofboth
must be grasped. Such coherence is itself essentially defined on the basis
of the coherence of constitution and way to be as reciprocally related
moments ofthe beingness ofbeings.27
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.2, Sec.26, p.1 99, Farell-Krell translation)
According to Heidegger, the thought of etemal recurrence plays a crucial role as
the counter-movement to nihilism and he gives a brilliant analysis of how this counter
movement must occur. The thought of eternal recurrence first sinks the thinker ofthis
thought into an abyss because ofits depth. If everything that we as finite human beings
undertake will repeat itself over and over, again and again, then everything seems to
occur in vain. If the same repeats itself infinitely, then everything is indifferent. The
fatalism of etemal recurrence seems to block the way to any possibility of establishing a
center, of establishing values which can act as guiding principles for life. Etemal
recurrence makes everything vain and pursuit ofwind. But this is only an illusion.
27 Deimach gehoeren in Nietzsches Philosophie auch Wille zur Macht und Wiederkehr des Gleichen
zusammen. Es ist daher im vorhinein ein metaphysisclies Miss- oder besser Unverstaendnis. wenn versucht
wird, den Willen zur Macht gegen die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen auszuspielen und diese gar ais
metaphysische Bestimmung des Seienden auszuscheiden. 1m Wahrheit muss gerade die
Zusammengehoerigkeit beider begriffen werden, aber diese Zusammengehoengkeit bestimmt sich selbst
wesentlich aus der Zusammengehoengkeit von Verfassung und Weise zu sein ais aufeinander bezueglicher
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Against the great illusion ofnihilism (that “Buddhism for Europeans” as Nietzsche cails
it in the 5 section of the Preface to the GeneaÏogy oJmorals) a powerful thought is
necessaiy. As Heidegger puts it
What is most difficuit at the outset is the confrontation with nihilism along
with the thought of retum inasmuch as the latter itself betrays a nihilistic
character in the fact that it refuses to think of an ultimate goal for beings.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.2, Sec.23, p. 174, farell-Krell translation)
There appears to be an unresolved tension in the way Heidegger interprets Nietzsche’s
eternal recurrence. On the one hand, there is an aspect of his interpretation that
acknowledges that etemal recurrence is something experienced by a human being or
subject. In this sense, etemal recurrence is associated with the problem ofthe flow of
time, the finitude of human experience and the apparent contingency associated to this
finitude. It is also connected to the experience of suffering and ofwhat Nietzsche cails
nihulism. But, on the other hand, there appears to be another aspect of Heidegger’ s
interpretation of eternal recurrence which delves into the physico-cosmological aspects of
this doctrine. This aspect ofthe interpretation also touches upon the issue ofthe proofof
eternal recurrence. Accordingly, what needs to be clarified is the following: Is etemal
recurrence a thought, something that is experienced as a possibility by a particular being
or subject or does it have the status of a metaphysical doctrine, part ofwhat Heidegger
calis Nietzsche’ s GrundteÏÏung?
Heidegger clearly rejects Nietzsche’ s attempts to ground eternal recurrence in
ternis ofthe deductïon ofphysico-cosmological arguments (i.e. based on concepts of
natural science in the Western tradition prevalent in Nietzsche’ s time) (Heidegger,
Nietzsche, Vol.2, Sec.23, p.1 16, Farell-Krell translation). There are veiy good reasons
Momente der Seiendheït des Seienden. » Nietzsche I, S.464
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to do this since there is littie doubt that Nietzsche’s notions of physics were sketchy at
best. Evidence for this Iack of knowledge on Nietzsche’s part and his own awareness of
ignorance is provided by the well-known fact that after having attained or “received” the
thought of etemal recurrence, Nietzsche seriously considered attending university level
courses in natural science in order to find a natural-scientific way of grounding the
thought of etemal recurrence. However, this is not the reason Heidegger gives for
questioning the validity of Nietzsche’s proof of eternal recurrence. He insists rather on
the lack of validity of any possible scientific or empirical proof of a metaphysical concept
(Nietzsche, Heidegger, Vol.2, p.lO7, Farell-KrelI translation). He certainly lias a point,
but this does notjustify what at times seems like a constant dichotomizing of metaphysics
and science. Indeed, we note that, when Heidegger describes science as tÏzeoria ( see text
“Wissenschaft und Besinnung” in Vortraege undAufsaetze), he takes a less severe stance
and he usually recognizes the proximity of “ancient science” to metaphysics and does not
outright dismiss the validity of that science, contrary to what lie sometimes seems to be
doing with respect to “modem science” and “technology”
What is more bothersome however is that Heidegger proposes a reconstruction of
Nietzsche’s proof of eternal recurrence solely in terms of metaphysical concepts and
theses. (See Section 12 : Summary presentation of the Thought : Being as a Whole as
Life and Force; the World as Chaos). Heidegger finds ample texts tojustify his
reconstruction. (He uses Nietzsche’s NacÏztass from 1881-1882.) However, lis
argumentation remains unconvincing. It is true that Nietzsche provides what he might
have thought to be a physico-cosmological proof of etemal recurrence based on the
argument of the state of equilibrium. I will discuss this Nietzschean strategy at length in
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Section 3.3. However, this is Ïikely a totaIly misled project despite the deep existential
implications of the thought of etemal recurrence. Thus, we should be as merciless
towards Heïdegger if he metaphysically misconstrues or wrongly re-constructs the
meaning of etemal recurrence as we are towards Nietzsche when he tries to ground the
philosophical vision of etemal recurrence by doubtful appeais to the physical theories of
his time.
1.3 Heïdegger ‘s interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of truth and of his concept of
justice
In the 1936-37 lecture course Tue will to power as knowledge Heidegger
introduces the concept of Nietzschean justice. This thought is also deait with in the essay
Nietzsche ‘s rnetaphvsics where justice is raised to one of the five rubrics of Nietzsche’s
thought alongside the wiii to power, etemai recurrence, nihuiism and Ueberrnensch.
Heidegger daims that this thought is very important for Nietzsche and has preoccupied
him since the early years of Nietzsche when he had taught the thinking of Heraciitus and
the pre-Socratics (see Nietzsche Nachlass, Earty PlziÏoïogica, KSA I, 1870-1873). I
accept Heidegger’s daim that ït is a worthwhile pursuit to enquire into the notion of
justice as it is elaborated in the Nietzschean corpus. However I find that the raising of
justice to a rubric in Nietzsche’s thought is perhaps exaggerated. Nietzsche deals most
clearly with the notion of justice when he writes about Anaximander’s extant fragment in
the text «Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen » (KSA I, 803 f.). I wili
quote Anaximander’s extant fragment in full because I think it is very important for
Nietzsche’s understanding of time and of the pre-socratics:
some other apeiron nature, from which corne into being ail the
heavens and the worids in them. And the source of coming-to-be
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for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens
‘according to necessity ; for they pay penalty and retribution to
each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time’,
as he describes them in these rather poetical terms.
(Simplicius in Phy. 24, 17, fragment 110 in Kirk, Raven and
Schofield, The Pre-Socratic PhilosopÏzers, 2’ edition).
The exact phrasing of this passage is stiil debated among the philologists of our
time. It is flot clear in this fragment whether it is Anaximander’s or whether the fragment
is a mere paraphrase that belongs to Simplicius or even Theophrastus. I do flot feel
qualified to treat of this question here. Nietzsche might have known about these debates
given his training as a philologist but even this is flot a daim that can be verified. I will
be interested in using the exact statement that Nietzsche published of the extant fragment,
namely:
Woher die Dinge ihre Enstehung haben, dahin muessen sie auch zu
Grunde gehen, nach der Nothwendigkeit; denn sie muessen Busse
zahien und fuer ihre Ungerechtigkeit gerichtet werden, gemaess
der Ordnung der Zeit.
(KSAJ, 818, 10).
I think that what is going on in the essay text Nietzsche’s metaphysics and in the
1936-37 course Tue witl w poweras knowledge in the section on truth and justice ofthat
text is an essentialization by Heidegger of Nietzsche’s moralism. We have to remember
that for Nietzsche ail metaphysical valuation was reducible to a daim about moral
valuations. This is Nietzsche’s generalized critique of metaphysics from the point of
view of morality. Heidegger is implicitly interested in showing that Nietzsche is the Iast
great metaphysician of the Western tradition. Insofar as he does this he must essentialize
Nietzsche’s thinking to a certain extent. This Heideggerian strategy is seen in the way he
reads the will to power as the essence of beings. The fact that Heidegger thinks that
justice is a very important Nietzschean category is shown by the fact that in the 1946 text
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Nietzsche’s metapÏzysics he conceives of justice as one of the five essential rubrics of
Nietzsche’s thought alongside the will to power, nihilism, the UebennenscÏz and etemal
recurrence of the same.
The notion ofjustice is closely connected to Nietzsche’s notion oftruth. In the
following, I wilÏ give an analysis of how Heidegger interprets Nietzsche’s notion of
justice in connection to the Nietzschean notion of truth. In the 1946 Nietzsche’s
metaphysics, under the rubric ofjustice, Heidegger begins by asserting that truth is a
necessary value for the will to power28. This is flot the common Nietzschean coining of
the phrase since Nietzsche would daim that truth is a necessary value for life. Heidegger
argues that Nietzsche thinks the essence of truth in accord with the long familiar
metaphysical definition of it as approximation of representation to the thing29. The
argument moves forward when Heidegger daims that adequation and revealing,
adequatio and atetheia reign in Nietzsche’s concept of truth as the stili reverberating yet
entirely unheeded resonance of the metaphysical essence of truth30. Heidegger
characterizes justice in three dïfferent ways, first by taking one of Nietzsche’s aphonsms
from 1884 that bears the title the Paths of freedom as:
A constructive, exclusive, annihilative mode of thought, arising from
estimations of value : The supreme representative of life itself (xiii, 42,
quoted by Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3-4 p.24l, FareIl-Krell).
In a second characterization, Heidegger describes justice as:
Justice, as a function of the panoramic power that looks beyond the
narrow perspectives of good and evil, and thus has a broader horizon of
advantage- the intention to preserve something that is more than this or
that person. (XIV, 80 this is Nietzsche quoted by Heidegger, Nietzsche,
28 (p.235 in Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, translation Farell-Krell)
29 (p.236, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3-4, translation Farell-Krell)
° (p.23$, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3-4, translation farell-Krell)
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Volume 3-4, p.244, farell-Krel t translation)
Finally, Heidegger makes use of a biographical/personal quote by Nietzsche in which he
daims that:
It happened quite late in my life- I was already out of my twenties- that I
discovered what is completely lacking in me : namely justice. «What is
justice ? And is it possible ? And if it were not possible how would life be
bearable » -I asked myseif questions like this incessantly. It profoundly
disturbed me to find, wherever I excavated within myself, no passions,
only narrow perspectives, only my unthinking acceptance of whatever is
alien to the very preconditions for justice : but where was lucidity (
Besonnenheit) that arises from comprehensive insight (aus umfaenglicher
Einsicht). (XIV, 385, f quoted by Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3-4,
p.248, fareJl-Krell translation).
I wilI flot analyze in detail the notion ofjustice anymore than I have up to now. It
is sufficient to say as I have mentioned above that justice is not an obvious Nietzschean
concept. Rather I view this as a Heideggerian strategy that has for a goal to essentialize
Nietzsche the moralist. As such, I sympathize with this strategy since it seems to
integrate and systematize Nietzsche in a very convincing way. Instead of having to
consider Nietzsche as a metaphysician of the will to power, Uebennensch, etemal
recurrence and nihilism doubled up with a critical moralist à ta La Rochefoucauld or
Pascal, we get a single Nietzsche that integrates both aspects into one. However, there is
a price to pay for this. There is a subtie elimination by Heidegger of Nietzsche’s concept
of life that is replaced by the concept of will to power. Heidegger has many issues vis-à
vis any bio]ogical concepts in Nietzsche. He rejects both Nietzsche’s life philosophy
(LebensphiÏosophie) and bis physiology of art as misled notions. Why he does that is not
entirely cÏear. Was he trying to subversively de-nazify Nietzsche vis-à-vis Baumler or
Rosenberg, or was he trying to advance bis own philosophy of Dasein which was
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undergoing a radical renovation at the time and which even at its best (i.e. most obviousiy
human-subjective) in Being and Time could flot clearly accommodate the notion ofbody
and physiology? These are questions that cannot be answered here but that shouid be
borne in mmd when affempting to understand Heidegger’ s essentialization of Nietzsche.
The essentialization ofNietzsche occurs in many ways. Let us look at some
decisive Heideggerian moves that inform his interpretation. First of ail, truth is a
necessary value for the will to power ( and not life as Nietzsche would say). Second at
the end of section 21 in the Wiii to power as knowledge, Heidegger daims that life itseif
is what at bottom Nietzsche calis justice.
(p.
149, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3,
translation Farell-Krell). This is again a distortion ofthe Nietzschean phrase which
daims that at bottom life is nothing but the will to power (In a previous version ofthe iast
aphorism of WiÏl to power, Nietzsche daims that at bottom life is nothing but eternal
recurrence of the same3 1)•
We have to keep at ieast these two distortions or interpretative moves in mmd
when we examine Heidegger’ s essentialization of Nietzsche. Another strategic decision
can be observed in Heidegger’ s treatment of Nietzsche’ s notion of truth. Heidegger is at
his most unconvincing here. In fact my daim is that Heidegger reduces Nietzsche’ s
notion of truth to make Nietzsche the culminator of the Western tradition’ s thinking of
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.2, p. 163) Actually, Heidegger “massages” the texi a bit since the previous
version of WtvI aphonsm 1067 reads as follows in KSA vol. 14, p.727 as:
a ring of good will, turrnng ever about itself alone, keeping to its wonted way: this
world, rny world-who is luminous enough to look at it without wishing to be blinded
? Strong enough to hold his soul up to this mirror ? His own mirror up to the mirror
of Dionysos? His own solution to the nddle of Dionysos? And were anyone able to
to do this, would he flot have to do more in addition ? To plight his troth to the the
“ring of rings”? By taking the oath of lus own return? By means of the will to wifl
oneseif once more and yet again? The wil to will back ail the things that have ever
been? To will fonvard to evezything that ever lias to be ? Do you know whal the
world is to me? And what I am wilhing when I will this world ?-
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truth as adequatio. We should seriously consider the fact that Heidegger is distorting
Nietzsche’s notion of truth in order to make room for his own concept of truth as
atetheia. On this reading Heidegger is interested to make Nietzsche look like the most
radical thinker of truth as representation and adequation. No matter how radical this
Nietzsche is, he would still be according to Heidegger but the culminator of the western
tradition’s thinking of truth as adequation/representation and flot the thinker of truth as
aletheia or truth as the truth of Being.
We want to focus on the analysis of Heidegger’s reconstruction ofNietzsche’s
notion of truth and how this is related to what Heidegger calls the concept of justice. In
section 21 of Will to power as Knowledge, Heidegger daims the following:
The thought of justice already dominates Nietzsche’s thinking in bis early
years. It can be historiologically shown that it dawned on him in bis
reflections on pre-Platonic metaphysics, especially that of Heraclitus. Yet
the fact that precisely this Greek thought of justice, of dike, sparked in
Nietzsche and continued to grow in bis thinking in an ever more concealed
and suent way, constantly igniting his thinking, bas its ground not in the
«historiological » work with the pre-Platonic philosophers but in the
historical determination that the last metaphysician of the West
obeys.(p. 137, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3, translation Farell-Krell)
Let us take this as Heidegger’s basic interpretative framework. A bit later on,
Heidegger daims that there is no reference (in Nietzsche’s published work ) to the fact
that, and the question of the extent to which the abolition of the metaphysical distinction
between a true and apparent world forces us back into the traditional metaphysical
essential determination of truth as hornoiosis and at the same time into the interpretation
of truth as justice32.
Heidegger goes on to sketch two alternatives in his interpretation of Nietzsche’s
32 (p.l38, Heidegger, Nietzsclte, Volume 3, translation Farell-KreIl)
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notion of truth. One will start from the Nietschean text and the second will have a look at
how the Western tradition has conceived of truth and how this cornes to a cuimination in
Nietzsche. Heidegger chooses aphorism 507 in the Will to power to ground his reading
of Nietzsche’s concept of truth. Since this is an important text I witl quote it here in full:
The valuation « I believe that this is so » as the essence of truth. In
valuations are expressed conditions of preservation and growth. Ail our
organs of knowledge and our sense are developed only with regard to
conditions of preservation and growth. Trust in reason and its categories,
in dialectic, therefore the valuation of logic, proves only their usefulness
for life, proved by experience not that something is true. That a great deal
of belief must be present; thatjudgments must be ventured; that doubt
concerning ail essential values is lacking- that is the precondition of every
living thing and its iife.
Therefore what is needed is that something must be helU to be true- not
that something is true. The « real and apparent world », I have traced this
antithesis. We have projected the conditions of our preservation as
predicated of being in general. Because we have to be stable in our beliefs
if we are to prosper we have made the real world a world not of change
and becoming but one of being.
(p.276, WiÏt topower, Kaufmann translation)
In his first approach to Nietzsche’s notion of truth, Heidegger daims that
Nietzsche understands truth as holding-to-be-true. But already in this notion of holding
to-be-true, Heidegger asserts that the traditionai essence of truth gains ascendancy in
Nietzsche’s way of characterizing truth.33 Heidegger then asks himself the question that
if the true world of beings collapses and with it the distinguishability of a merely
apparent world also, does not the most general essence of truth in the sense of Ïwmoiosis
get pulled into this collapse34. Heidegger answers this negatively. He arrives to the
P.139’ Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3, translation farell-Krell
p.l40, Heidegger. Nietzsche, Volume 3, translation Farell-Krell
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conclusion that as Izonzoiosis, truth must be what Nietzsche cails justice35. In what is
charactenstic of Heidegger’s own project and is flot concemed with the interpretation of
Nietzsche, the following daim is made:
Nietzsche’s thought of «justice » as the formulation of truth in the
extreme, is the final necessity and inmost consequence of the fact that
aletheia had to remain unthought in its essence and the truth of Being
unquestioned. The thought of «justice » is the occurrence of Being’s
abandonment of being within the thinking of beings themselves.
(p.l4l, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3, Farell-Krell translation)
Later on in the section on justice, Heidegger characterizes justice as being essentially
Iinked to life as its ground and possibility. Here again, we are faced with an important
interpretative decision. Heidegger wants to connect justice and life together in such a
way that justice takes the place of the will to power.
In this connection, Heidegger daims that with the insight into the essence of
justice as the essential ground of life, the aspect is fixed in which alone it can be decided
whether, how and within what limits Nietzsche’s thinking is biologistic36. In his effort to
identify will to power and justice, Heidegger daims that the notion of will to power as a
field of energies and forces is misled. To try to understand the will to power in this way
is a mistake in Heidegger’s opinion. This blinds one to the essential connection between
will to power and justice. That Heidegger is trying to bring out this connection is evident
from the passage that I have discussed above that I will now quote in full.
According to the constitution we characterized, justice is the ground of
possibility and necessity of every kind of harmony of man with chaos,
whether such harmony be the higher one of art or the equally necessary
one of knowledge. Commanding explanation and poetizing
transfiguration are « right » and just, because life itself at bottom is what
(p.I4l, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3, translation Farell-Krell).
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145, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3, Farell-Krell translation)
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Nietzsche calis justice.
(p. 149, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3, translation Farell-Krell)
This paragraph clearly shows what Heidegger is up to. When he transforms
Nietzsche’s saying that life itself is at bottom will to power (or etemal recurrence of the
same) into the saying that life itself at bottom is what Nietzsche cails justice, he is
operating a distortion. By linking justice to wilI to power and claiming that in their
essence these two concepts are the same and then linking these two concepts to the
concepts of life and being, he has effectiveÏy essentialized Nietzsche the moralist into
Nietzsche the metaphysician. There are problems with this view, but it is beyond the
scope of this section to discuss them. For now, I will remark that the quote that I gave at
the beginning of the section and according to which for Nietzsche «life »is merely
another word for Being is highly problematic. For Nietzsche life and will to power are
linked to becoming. Becoming is more essential than being. Heidegger himself daims
that in articulating the term «will to power », Nietzsche found a new name for
becoming. So the question that has to be answered by a critical reading of Heidegger’s
Nietzsche interpretation is how the transformation of the will to power as the essence of
life and of becoming into the will to power as the Being of beings can occur without
causing a great distortion to Nietzsche’s thought.
1.4 Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism and his
appropriation of that concept.
We now have to examine in detail Heidegger ‘s interpretation of Nietzsche’s
notion of nihilism. This discussion is rather complex since it is here that Heidegger ‘s
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criticisrn of Nietzsche begins to take off. This happens chronologically later in
Heidegger ‘s lecture courses since this critique is based on the lecture given in 1940
entitled European NiÏzitism. In fact Heidegger believes that Nietzsche does flot and
cannot think nihilism through.37 This is the case because Nietzsche does flot have a clear
view of the history of Western metaphysics and its forgetfulness of Being. The
discussion of nihilism is complex because it is difficuit to draw the line between the way
Nietzsche conceives nihilism and the way Heidegger appropriates that notion for his own
purposes. Thus I will limit my discussion to Heidegger’s re-construction of Nietzsche’s
thought as much as I can.
Heidegger focuses most of his discussion of nihilism on Nietzsche’s related
concepts of will to power and value-positing. Nihilism is the historical fact that the
highest values have lost their value, i.e. humanity can no longer see them as a source of
meaning and order. But nihilism is more than a simple historical event. It is not
something that happens as the french or American revolutions are said to occur. Rather
nihilism is the inner law of history: its logic so to speak.38 Here it must be specified that
history is understood by Heidegger as the history of Western metaphysics. This history
seems to be composed of diverse epochs of Being to which correspond what he calis
fundamental metaphysical positions.39 There is a reÏationship between the actual
concrete history of peoples, their institutions, laws and societies and the various epochs
(Heidegger, Nietzsclte, Vol.4, Nihilism as determined by the history of Being, p.204, Farell-Krell
translation)
This is Heidegger’s historicization of nihilism, Nietzsche might agree to a certain extent with this
interpretation but he might also see concrete historical events such as the French Revolution ( the rise of the
slave morality) as concrete manifestations of nihilism.
The history of western metaphysics is flot identical with the history of Being which is made up of the
various epochs of Being. The history of Being functions as a kind of genealogy of the history of
metaphysics that points out what has been left unsaid and unthought in the history of metaphysics because
that history presupposes as its background an understanding of Being and of the way it gives itself over to
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that make up the history of Being.
Heidegger singles out Plato and his theory of Ideas as the onginator of the history
of Western metaphysics. The values of the Good, the Beautiful and the Just are posited
at the inception of the history of metaphysics in the form of the Platonic Ideas. The
positing of the Good, the Beautiful and the Just as of supreme importance for life occurs
through the identification of many instances of the unique Idea of Good, Beautiful, Just
in various sensible objects. The Good,..., the Just, are thus affirmed in terms oftheir
univocal supersensible character as against the multipiicity of their concrete sensible
instantiations or embodiments. Thus for Heidegger, Plato identifies being as the One.
He is seen as the originator of metaphysics with the inception of the concept of being as
Uniqueness (Oneness, Univocity).
Heidegger gives an interpretation of Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism.
Heidegger believes that for Nietzsche ail metaphysics is a variation on Platonism40.
The inversion of Platonism begins with the daim that thefundamentum for the institution
of new values is no longer the supersensible realm as opposed to the sensible reaim of
concrete embodiments but rather the will to power. The discussion of the will to power is
intricate and I have already afluded to it in the previous section of this essay. What is new
in this section on Nietzsche’s concept of nihiiism is that the will to power acts as a
condition of beings:
When will to power dares to acknowledge itself as the fundamental trait of
man in the diverse epochs of its manifestation.
40 Every metaphysics is a ‘system of value-estimations’ or, as Nietzsche says morality ‘understood as the
doctrine of the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon ‘life’ comes to be-’(Bevond Good aizd
Evil, Section 19)
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beings, everything must be assessed in terms of the question of whether it
enhances wili to power or diminishes and hinders it. As the fundamental
trait of beings, will to power conditions ail beings in their being.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Sec.3, p.202, Farell-Krell translation)
The will to power is the principie of a new institution of values. This new institution is a
transvaluation of ail the values that held sway precedentiy. One shouid flot minimize the
radicalism of such a daim. What Nietzsche is after, is an absolute tabula rasa. In a way
he wants to be through with the past and the values of the past in order to liberate human
beings and prepare them fora radicaliy new dawn41. According to Heidegger, it is
precisely in the radical character of the transvaluation that the fulfilled essence of
nihilism lies (as opposed to a Hegelian semi-transvaluation of platonic-Christian values
that is best iilustrated in Hegel’s concept of mediation (Vennittiung)).
To understand the Heideggenan appropriation of nihilism we must look at the
criticism inveighed by Heidegger against the way Nietzsche understands nihilism. To
use Heideggerian language Nietzsche does flot think through the essence of nihiiism. The
main reasons for Nietzsche’s inability to think through the essence of nihiiism are the
foilowing : 1) According to Heidegger, Nietzsche does not overcome the thinking of
Being as representedness ( Sein ais Vorgesteiitheit42) 2) in Nietzsche’s thinking the
difference between the essence of truth and Being collapses. This is the case because
Nietzsche is stiil operating within the horizon of truth as adequation-representation.
The usage of the term “tabula rasa” may be objected to in the context of Nietzsche’s project. The
expression has too many Enlightenment connotations according to some commentators. Nietzsche is flot a
revolutionary in this sense but rather a gradualist who sees the seif-overcoming of historical entities like the
imperiuln ro,izanu,n as occurring over hundreds of years. I agree with these commentators that Nietzsche
does flot seek revolutionary upheavals such as the French revolution. However, it is flot clear that a right
wing, authoritarian revolution might flot be favored by him at times. And it is fairly clear that what I am
referring to as a spiritual, inner revolution in the reaim of life-values is acceptable to Nietzsche.
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According to Heidegger, Nietzsche does flot realize that ail bis questioning is made
possible as against the notion of truth as aletheia and within the horizon of the question
of Being. 3) In Nietzsche’s thought Being is reduced to a value through the metaphysics
of the will to power. 4) Nietzsche does flot extricate himself from the metaphysics of
subjectivity but merely comptetes it through his metaphysics of the will to power. In this,
the relationship to Descartes is telling: Heidegger tries to show that Nietzsche is a hyper
Cartesian. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche merely replaces Descartes’
methodological prioritizing of inner awareness with a new methodologicai principle: the
body:
The method is decisive. That Nietzsche posits the body in place of the
soul and consciousness alters nothing in the fundamental metaphysical
position which is determined by Descartes. Nietzsche merely coarsens it
and brings it to the edge...
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol .4, Sec. 17, p.1 33, Farell-Krell translation)
The first daim I have made above, that Nietzsche thinks being as representedness
is mainly expounded in Section 17 of European Nihilism : Descartes’ Cogito Sum
(Volume 4 of Heidegger’ s Nietzsche lectures). The notion of representedness is a
compiex and subtie one. li is tied to Heidegger’s entire reading of the history of Western
metaphysics. I will only discuss this concept insofar as it clarifies Heidegger’s
understanding of Nietzsche. To quote Heidegger:
Representedness as beingness makes what is represented possible as the
being. Representedness (Being) becomes the condition of the possibility
of what is represented and presented-to and thus cornes to stand; that is
the condition of possibility of the object.
(Heidegger, Njetzsche, Vol.4, Sec.26, p.174, Farell-Krell translation)
The concept of Being as representedness is particuiarly difficuit because it bridges many
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domains. The main thing that is happening in Section 17 is an attempt by Heidegger to
place Descartes’ epistemologicat principle in a historical context. Thus Heidegger gives
a historico-epistemological account of the cogito sum. This account derives ïts
importance from the fact that Descartes’ principle is crucial to an understanding of what
Heidegger considers to be modernity’s entanglement in re-presentational thinking. It is
Heidegger’s belief that Nietzsche does not escape this entanglement any more than any
other modem thinkers (including Hegel). Representedness and the understanding of
Being as representedness consist in the fact that:
That to which everything is referred back as to an unshakable ground is
the full essence of representation itself, insofar as the essence of Being
and truth is determined by it, as well as the essence of man, as the one
representing, and the nature of the definitive standard as such.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol .4, Sec. 17, p.1 14, Farell-Krell translation)
This refemng back consists in a double movement since there is a referring back to the
full essence of representation itself as mentioned above as well as a referring back to that
which is actualÏy responsible for doing the representing: the I or subject. This is the
case:
Because the me is implied in cogitare, because the relation to the one
representing stiil belongs essentially to representing, because all
representedness of what is represented is gathered back to it, therefore the
one representing who can thus cali himself lis the subject in an emphatic
sense, is, as il were, the subject in the subject, back to which everything
that lies at the very basis of representation refers. (my italics)
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.4, Sec.17, p.l14, Farell-Krell translation)
Heidegger daims that Nietzsche has misunderstood Descartes’ position and that his
understanding of truth and subjectivity is still very much indebted to Descartes. The
nature of what Nietzsche describes as the will to power is somehow still indebted to
Descartes’ positioning of the locus of knowledge within the subject:
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What ïs happening here ? Nietzsche refers the ego cogito back to an ego
volo and interprets the velle as willing in the sense of wiIl to power, which
he thinks as the basic character of beings. But what if the positing of this
basic character became possible only on the basis of Descartes’
metaphysical position? Then Nietzsche’s critique of Descartes would be
a misunderstanding of the essence of metaphysics.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.4, Sec.19, p.129, Farell-Krelt translation)
Heidegger takes particular offense at Nietzsche’s daim that when individuals engage in
logic or speculative philosophy, the concept of substance that is used is derived from the
subject-concept and not the other way around. (« The substance-concept a consequence
ofthe subject-concept: not the reverse! ») (WM, 485 from the year 1887 quoted by
Heidegger).
Historically, the subject has been developed from the Aristotelian concept of
substance, through a scholastic-Cartesian development. But Nietzsche is articulating
something about logic and grammar when he is making this substance originate in the
concept of the subject43. Heidegger argues that Nietzsche’s notion of perspectival truth
only apparently overcomes the traditional notion of truth as adequation-representation.
Heidegger’s argument is rather obscure at this point. He daims that since Nietzsche
believes that truth is a necessary error ( «Truth is the kind of error without which a
certain kind of living being (namely man ) could flot live. The value for life ultimately
decides. » ( WM, 493, quoted by Heidegger) and that truth ïs the foundation of logic,
then logic should stem from the will to truth. But because Heidegger finds a quote in
which Nietzsche daims precisely the opposite (« Logic does not stem from the will to
truth» WM, 512, from the year 1885 quoted by Heidegger), lie believes that he is entitled
to daim that Nietzsche’s concept of truth as vital error and illusion is based on the
(see Miche! Haar in La ma!adie native du !angage in Nietzsche et la métaphysique)
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traditional concept of truth as adequation of knowledge with things and reality.
Heidegger gives a pithy summary of his understanding of Nietzsche’s position:
When Nietzsche says that the concept of the «I » and thus the « subject»
is an invention of « logic », then he must have rejected subjectivity as
«illusion », at least where it is claimed as the basic reality of
metaphysics.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol .4, Sec. 19, p. 133, Farell-Krell translation)
In what follows, I will give an account of Heidegger’s reading of Plato and Kant, in the
context of his Nietzsche lectures. This account is necessary because Heidegger
establishes a connection and historical continuity between Being as agathon (Plato),
Being as representedness (Descartes-Kant) and Being as value (Nietzsche).
Heidegger daims that there is a connection between the platonic agathon and
thinking in values. But thinking in values is only possible on the basis of an
understanding of Being as representedness. This understanding is indebted to Descartes.
Heidegger’s argument is given as follows: Plato had a concept of the idea that functioned
as a condition that allows objects to be known. But above even the ideas lies lie toit
agathou idea, the idea of the Good. («agathon, esti epekeiîza tes ousias prebeiai kai
dunarnei » quoted by Heidegger from the Republic) Heidegger believes that the idea of
the Good functions for Plato on an analogy with the objects of sight and the faculty of
sight. In order to see the objects of sight, this faculty requÏres not only the objects
themselves but also a third mediating factor. This factor is light, to phos.
Plato daims in the sixth book of the Repubtic, that lie tou agathou idea functions
in the same way as light does for sight for the ideas and the faculty of knowledge. We
humans need something like the Good to orient our ability to know the ideas. The good
functions flot unlike light in that it allows our faculty of knowledge to know the ideas.
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Thus accordïng to Heidegger, the Good functions as making able, as a making fit for
Insofar as it does, this already anticipates to a certain extent Kant’s conditions of
possibility of knowledge. Plato gives a decisive interpretation of Being as Idea and more
precisely he tou agathou idea which for Heidegger represents the Idea of ideas.
Moreover, by giving Being prionty in the sequence of knowÏedge (i.e. in the
process of knowledge, Being as Idea is what allows beings to be known and in this
respect it cornes before beings), Heidegger believes that Plato has prepared the way for
Kant’s theory of knowledge.
Ultimately however, Kant is the one that brings about to completion the thought
of Being as representedness. This happens through his emphasis on the fact that the
conditions of possibility of the objects of experience are the same as the conditions of
possibility of experience in general. («The conditions of the possibility of experience in
general are at the same time conditions of the possibiÏity of the objects of experience»
A 158, B 197, Critique of Pure Reason) But from this there is only one step to conceiving
Being as representedness. This is the case because according to Heidegger:
The highest basic principle of Kant’s metaphysics says that the conditions
of the possibility of representing what is represented are also —that is to
say, are nothing else but —conditions of the possibility of what is
represented. They constitute representedness... The basic principle says:
Being is representedness.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol .4, Sec.26, p.1 75, Farel l-Krelt translation)
The gist of Heidegger’s argument as to how Being is reduced to value for
Nietzsche can be found in a 1944-46 treatise published under the titie Nihitisnz as
detennined by tue history ofBeing. Heidegger begins by claiming that Nietzsche’s
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metaphysics constitutes nihilism proper.’4 According to Heidegger, nihiiism proper stili
operates within the horizon of the history of metaphysïcs. Although it daims to have
liberated itself from the principies of the beyond and transcendence, nihilism proper does
not clearly express the essence of nihilism.
This is the case because within the mode of thinking of nihuiism proper, the
concept of nihilism itself is only thought from the point of view of value45. From the
point of view of nihilism proper (which represents Nietzsche’s position), nihilism is
simply the devaluation of the highest values. Furthermore Nietzsche sees as pressing the
task of overcoming nihiiism. However, this task of overcoming nihilism is to be
undertaken through a revaluation of ail values with respect to the principie of creation of
ail values called the will to power. li is here that Heidegger inveighs his strongest
criticism against Nietzsche’s metaphysics for in his opinion, Nietzsche has
misunderstood the way out of nihilism. It is the desire to overcome nihilism through the
creation of new values in terms of an enhancement of the wiiI to power that covers over
the reai nature of nihilism:
For it is precisely in the positing of new values from the will to power, by
which and through which Nietzsche believes he will overcome nihilism
that there is nothing to Being itself which has now become a value.
(Hei degger, Nietzscïze, Vol .4, p.203, Farell-Krell translation)
Heidegger argues that Nietzsche understands overcoming as revaluation and this
understanding is couched in an understanding of the will to power as the principle of ail
‘ (Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.4, p.2O2, Farell-Krell translation). Later on Heidegger will make a
generalization and daim that metaphysics as such is nihilism proper.
To what extent is thinking in values and Nietzsche’s emphasis on Wertsetzung related to the capitalistic
notion of value and commodity, Marx’s notion of surplus value etc. Is there a connection between
technology, capitalism and thinking in values ? Or is the term value as Nietzsche uses it purely political
moral-psychological?
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valuation. Because of this Heidegger daims that Nietzsche does flot cali into question
value thinking itself (Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.4, p.2O3, Volume 4, Farell-Krell
translation). for Heidegger, Nietzsche’s metaphysics is essentially Ïirnited since it does
flot allow what is rnost worthy of questioning, Being, to corne to the fore. Nietzsche’s
metaphysics does flot allow us to understand Being as Being.
This amounts to saying that (and this can be argued elsewhere in connection with
Heidegger’s notion of the essence of nihilism) Nietzsche does not attain what Heidegger
calls the essence of nihilism which is the fact that in the history of rnetaphysics there is
nothing (Nichts) to Being itself : put otherwise western metaphysics (which culminates in
Nietzsche’s metaphysics) neyer thinks or asks about Being (Sein) itself but rernains
entangled in the question of the being (das Seiende). Elsewhere and perhaps in
connection to this, Heidegger daims that the wiIl to power understood as thinking in
values does flot let Being be46.
Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism is essentially incomplete since it reduces
Being to a value. Thus Heidegger can make the daim that
Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism is not an overcoming of nihilism. It
is the ultimate entanglement in nihilism.
(Heidegger, Nietzsclze, Voi.4, p.203, Farell-Krell translation)
The essence of nihilism becomes a part of Heidegger’s philosophical project in an effort
to trace the history of how it is that there is nothing to Being. The discussion of the
essence of nïhilisrn ïs quite intricate. Furthermore, I do not think that it explicitly sheds
light on Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche but is rather a development ofHeidegger
‘s own project. Thus I have not discussed this notion in detail, but have limited rnyself to
46
“Wenn jedoch der Wert das Sein nicht das Sein sein laesst, was es ais das Sein selbst ist,...”
(Heidegger,Holzwege,S.239,Klostermann, 1963)
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the parts needed to clarify Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche.
1.5 Heide%ger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the Uebermeitsch.
Heidegger’s interpretation of the UebermenscÏz is connected to the way he
interprets the notion of the will to power. The concept of the will to power is seen as the
completion and consummation of metaphysics. This is the case because subjectivity
conceived as the wilI to power reaches what Heidegger cails its unconditioned
(unbedingte Subjektivitaet) state. In this context, Heidegger has developed what he cails
«vorstettende Vernwzft ». This will tie in with his reading of the Uebermensch.
Heidegger sees a development that begins with Vorstettung (representation) and ends
with the wiII to power. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche accomplishes the
«Vollendung der unbedingten Subjektivitaet ». This completion or exhaustion of
subjectivity occurs through a move from VorstetÏung (representation) to Veniunftswille
(rational wi]l) to will to power. Finally, il is the completion of unconditional subjectivity
in the form of the will to power that lays the ground for the necessity of the
Uebermensch. In Heidegger’s words:
The consummate subjectivity of will to power is the metaphysical origin
of the essential necessity of the ‘Uebermensch’47.
(Heidegger, Nietzsclze, Vol.3, Sec.5, p.22S, Farell-KreII translation)
It is flot clear however, how the move from Vorstettung to Veniunftswitte
happens. What is certain is that the shift occurs at more than one level. Since the
transition is not so easy to follow, I will give a close reading of the section of the essay
Die vollendete Subjektivitaet des Willens zut Macht ist der metaphysische Ursprung der
Wesensnotwendigkeit des « Uebermenschen ». (Heidegger, Nietzsche ,VoI .2,S.302)
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Nietzsche ‘s metaphysics that treats of the Uebermensch. Heidegger begins by asserting
that man possesses a mastery of beings in virtue of the special relation to Being that is his
own. Second, Heidegger daims that the Uebermensch is the human being that comports
himself toward Being as both will to power and as eternal recurrence. Heidegger also
asserts that the Uebermensch ïs the pure exercise of the wiii to power. He is what allows
history to be seen both from point of view of revaluation of ail values and within the
basic delineaments of ciassical nihilism. The notion of Uebemiensch is related to the
notion of will which becomes essentiai in modemity:
The uni versai though not exhaustive concept of Uebermensch means
primarily the essence of that mankind which thinks of itself in a
modem way that is to say, wills itself.
(Heidegger, Nietzscïze, Vol.3, Sec.5, p.2l7, Farell-Krell translation)
But the notion of Uebermensch also pertains to ciassical nihilism as the expressly wiiled
negation of the previous essence of man (Heidegger, Nietzsche, Voi.3, Sec.5, p.217,
Fareil-Kreil translation). This negation of the previous essence of man negates reason
and in so doing is considered to be nihilistic by Heidegger. Heidegger also characterizes
the nihilistic negation of reason with respect to animalitas and the body. According to
Heidegger, by putting an enormous emphasis on the phenomenon of the body, Nietzsche
plays an essential roie in the history of Western metaphysics. He gives an interpretation
of modem man in terms of animalitas. According to Heidegger, this distinguishes him
greatly from Hegel whose whole system was focused on the discussion and elaboration of
the rationatitas of man. What Nietzsche characterizes as animality is:
the body bodying forth, that is replete with its own overwhelming urges.
The name body identifies the distinctive unity in the constructs of
domination in au drives, urges and passions that will life itself. Because
animality lives oniy by bodying it is as will to power.
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(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Sec.5, p.21 8, FareII-Krell translation)
Altematively, Heidegger interprets the nihilistic negation of reason in terms of
the concept of representation. He begins by giving a historical account of the notion of
representation and its relationship to the concept of subject. There is indeed a radical
change with respect to the ancients and prirnarily with respect to Aristotie in the meaning
of the word subject. For Aristotle a subject was merely sornething of which a property
could be predicated. In the sentence: « the house is blue » the word « house » is subject
from a grammatical point of view. The object the word « house » designates is also
subject according to Aristotle’s metaphysical terminology. Now, for us modems (in the
sense of Descartes. Nietzsche, Heidegger and even Hegel would flot necessarily agree
with Descartes), the object designated by the word «house » is flot a subject but an
object. Furthermore it is only an object insofar or in virtue of the fact that it can appear
as such to a hurnan subject.
With the evolution of the notion of subject, the related concept of representation
changes as well. The active, rnodifying aspect of representation cornes to the fore.
Representation becornes a criterion for what is allowed as perceivable for a human
subject:
Representation cornes to be the tribunal that decides about the beingness
of beings and declares that in the future only what is placed before it in
and through representation and thus is secured for it may be considered a
being.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Sec.5, p.2l9, Farell-Krell translation)
Furtherrnore, there is an expansive aspect to representation that impels it to always
expand its scope. Heidegger daims that there is an intrinsic striving to representation
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that makes it stnve to transform everything that is perceivable by a human subject into
something that can be accounted for in terms of representation48.
What Heidegger is sketching in this section on the Uebermensch is the twofold
movement that transforms representation and the subject into the notion of wiIl to power.
The tensions in both the notions of representation and the subject give us a hint that at the
bottom of these notions there is a more fundamental phenomenon : what Nietzsche bas
identified as the will to power. Heidegger seems concemed to show that both the notions
of representation and the subject evolve in the history of the metaphysics preceding
Nietzsche and culminate into Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power. This evolution is
sketched by Heidegger as follows.
The faculty of representation (VorstetÏung) is transformed by Nietzsche into
calculative value-positing t recÏznendes Wertsetzen ). Representation becomes a tool that
allows the will to posit values49. Insofar as the wiII can represent entities or objects it
experiences its own power because it is able in a manner of speaking to put the world
together. But this putting the world together is seen itself as a function of the value that it
bas for life, i.e. whether it enhances life’s intensity or diminishes it. Thus,
representation shifts from being the piimary feature of reason as Kant saw it ( at least in
one possible interpretation of bis philosophy) and becomes subordinated to the
Wertsetzung of the will to power.
R is worth noting that for Heidegger, the identification by Nietzsche of the wiIl to
power as the more fundamental phenomenon lying at the basis of the concepts of
representation and the subject does not necessarily mean that Nietzsche has overcome
48 (Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Sec.5, pp.22 l-222, Farell-Krell translation)
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, VoI.3, Sec.5, p.224, Farell-KreII translation)
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those notions. This is especially observable when Heidegger emphasizes that Nietzsche
thinks the absolute ami consummate subjectivity ofthe wiII to power. Thus, the moment
of subjectivity has flot been stripped away from the will to power as some Nietzsche
interpretations might daim but only radicalized and absolutized:
Fulfilment here means that the extreme suppressed possibility of the
essence of subjectivity becomes the essential center. Will to power is
therefore both absolute and —because inverted- consummate subjectivity.
Such consummation at the same time exhausts the essence of
absoluteness.5°
The transition to the notion ofUebermensch is made in terms ofthe notion of
consummate subjectivity. Because man possesses the ability to wilI and to posit values
and because these abilities are inherently related to the notion of consummate subjectivity
man becomes the receptacle, in a manner of speaking, of consummate subjectivity:
Man, because he atone is in the midst ofbeings as such and as a whole as
a representational, vatziative will, must extend to consummate subjectivity
the abode ofits pure essence.5’
Man, as the being that represents and posits values is conceptualized as the embodiment
ofthe consummate subjectivity ofthe will to power. But the notion ofman is itself
radicalized when it is thought of in terms ofthe will to power. As the pure exercise ofthe
will to power, man becomes what Nietzsche calls the Uehermensch:
As the supreme subject of consummate subjectivity he [the Uebermensch]
is the pure powering ofthe will to power.52
50 (Heidegger, Nietzsche,VoÏ.3, Sec.5, p,225, translation David farell-Krell)
51 (Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Sec.5, p.226, Farell-Krell translation)
52 (Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Sec.5, p.226, Farci!- Krell translation)
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This radicalization of the concept of man into Uebermensch is also characterized by
Heidegger as follows:
Not only does he (the Ueberrnensch) draw away from and beyond the
human essence as it has been heretofore, but, as the reversai of that
essence he surpasses himself at the same time to what is absolute for him,
that is, to the entirety of beings, the etemal recurrence of the same.
(Heidegger, Nietzsclze, Vol.3, Sec.5, p.226, translation Farell-Kreil.)
This passage seems to imply that man becomes the UebennenscÏz thus going beyond or
overcoming man as he has historicaÏty existed by ttanscending the experience of nihulism
through the thought of etemal recurrence. Thus, the Uebennensch is the man that
realizes that each and everyone of his actions no matter how contingent ïs necessary and
imbued with meaning.
What seems to differentiate the UebennenscÏt from prevÏous man is the realization
that necessity, historical and existentïal, is his own doing. He realizes the divinity that is
potentially present within himself. As Nietzsche puts it:
Ail the beauty and sublimity we have bestowed on real and imaginary
things I wish to reclaim as the property and product of man —as his fairest
apology. Man as poet, as thinker, as god, as love, as power: O with
what regal liberality he has lavished gifts upon things so as to impoverish
himself and make himself feei wretched ! His most selfless act hitherto
has been to admire and worship and know how to conceai from himseif
that it was he who created what he admired.
(Nietzsche quoted by Heidegger)53
Heidegger comments this passage by raising the question as to the potential
humanization of beings that seems to be impiied in the passage. He daims that this
humanization is only apparent and that what is thought through the Uebenne,zsch is
rather a reversai and de-humanizing of what was hitherto taken as humanization.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, p.22$, Vol.3, Farell-KrelI translation)
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(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Sec.5, farell-Krell translation)
Heidegger’s reading of the UeberinenscÏz sees that concept as essentially
connected to the notion of eternal recurrence:
At the time of the most luminous brightness, when beings as a whole show
themselves as etemal recurrence of the same, the will must will the
Uebermensch; for only within the prospect of the Uebermensch is the
thought of eternal recurrence to be borne»
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, p.227, Vol.3, Farell-Krell translation)
It is only according to the perspective opened up by the concept of Ueberrnensch that the
thought of eternat recurrence becomes bearable. This is the case because the overcoming,
the going beyond that is intrinsic to that thought must find a focus, an embodiment in the
world and flot in a ‘beyond’ as was the case in previous religious and metaphysical
systems.
But why should this focus, embodiment, be the UebermenscÏz ? It is because as
Heidegger puis it, he is the pure exercise of the will to power. For Nietzsche, the depth
of eternal recurrence lies in the fact that it brings transcendence back into the immanent
world54. It can be said that the thought of eternal recurrence inverts platonism. The Jocus
of the inversion is placed within the Uebenneizsch. This is the case because of the
selective, transformative nature of the thought of eternal recurrence. The difficulty of
such a thought makes a setection as to wÏzo is capable of thinking this thought. It only
allows the high-minded, the noble nature to absolutely affirm his apparently absurd and
contingent existence through the affirmation of the recurrence of every single act
experience as necessary. The weak, the sickly, the proponents of the slave morality are
(cf section on 3.3 The forgotten lïnk between eternal recurrence of the same and the concepts of freedom
and transcendence)
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those who succumb or are themselves transformed and transfigured into something
higher when faced with the possibility of the return.
But this Iogic needs of necessity a culmination, a peak and mountain-top, a
what-for and Wozu. This is provided by the Uebermensch. The Uebermensch seems to
provide a stable direction and goal towards which etemal recurrence can progress. It
provides a goal that is not the Christian-Platonic beyond. The Uebenneîzsch seems to be
an ideal (no matter how loathsome this word might be for Nietzsche) that man can strive
for in the immanent and concrete world and thus is part of Nietzsche’s struggie to invert
Platonism.
The Uebermensch is in my opinion another way in which Nietzsche seeks to think
seif-transcendence and in this it is essentially linked to the notion of etemal recurrence. If
the will to power abolishes the transcendence of the supersensible and reduces everything
to the plane of immanence, then the Uebennensch preserves the possibility of
transcendence albeit in a purely horizontal, non-vertical scheme. On the one hand the
Uebermensch is the inheritor of the bourgeois-socialistic notion of progress in that it
posits a form of teleology within the essence of man man can improve himself, he can
go beyond his immediate, historical and social predicament and reach a finality or an
escÏzaton. On the other hand the Uebennensch is inherently tied to the notion of the
malleability of man that is made possible through modem science. Man is capable of
manipulating himself and nature around him : he can spiit the atom, understand and
manipulate his own genetic code, manipulate (and perhaps create) his moods through the
applications of psycho-pharmacological medication and drugs.
This constant transformation of the essence of man also corresponds to the notion
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of UebennenscÏz. Modem man, whose inner teleology leads to the Uebennensch bas no
essence. He can «choose » and « design » himself through technology. Technology is the
pure exercise of the will to power enacted by the Uebennensch. Because he is both
preservation-negation and enhancement of the essence of man, the UeberrnenscÏz
embodies the essence of modem technology. In the movement from man to
Uebermensch, technology frees man to be himself in an infinite act of self-choosing and
self-transformation. This act is infinite because it is tied to the infinite possibilities
opened up by modem science and technology. This is the case because there is no end in
sight to the evolution of the sciences and technology. It is true that man is becoming
increasingly dependent on technology and that anything that does flot fulfili the
technological model becomes excluded. li could be thought that technology rather
ensiaves man instead of freeing him to achieve his infinite potential. This is the totalizing
feature of technology: it conceives of Being univocally only with respect to beings. It
does flot let us understand ourselves or does not allow beings to be revealed in other
modes than its own mode of revealing. It obliterates the relation to the divine as
transcendence. As Heidegger writes, the divine itself bas been reduced to a mere causa
in the chain of causes (“Gott kann im Lichte der Kausalitaet zu einer Ursache, zur causa
efficiens herabsinken.” “Frage nach der Technik”, Vortraege und Aufsaetze, S.30.
« God seen in the light of causality can fali to the level (rank) of a cause, of the causa
efficiens. » my translation). Its dignity and mystery are reduced to the fact that it
«causes » and «creates » Creation and its creatures. The idea of the divine, moving
itself, manifesting itsetf from within itself (self-moved and self-manifested) is
incomprehensible from the point of view of the Gesteti in which everything is understood
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from the point of view of its utility and manipulability in the plane of immanence55.
As a conclusion for this section I would like to draw attention to a last quote from
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche:
How would matters stand if, by means of a uniqueiy nihilistic reversai,
man as he has been hitherto must first be transformed into the
Uebernzensch and if [the] Uebennensch, as the supreme will to power,
shouid will to let beings be as beings56.
This passage is important because it constitutes the beginning of Heidegger’s critique of
Nietzsche. According to him wiII to power as value-positing does not let Being (flot
beings but Being) be. (“Wenn jedoch der Wert das Sein nicht das Sein sein laesst, was es
ais das Sein selbst ist,
...“ (Heidegger,Hotzwege,S.239,Klostermann,1963))
This idea of self-manifestedness and seif-revelation is what Heidegger has in mmd when he talks about
the concept of phusis and phuein. The paradox is that even technology can function as phusis but it is an
exclusive and totalizing kind of phuein that characterizes the technological epoche.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Sec.5, p.228, FareIl-Krell translation)
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2 Unity of eternal recurrence and will to power as articulation of Heideger’s
concept of the essence of modem technology.
In this section I introduce what I take to be Heidegger’s essential insight into
Nietzsche’s metaphysics: the thesis of the unity of the eternal recurrence and the will to
power. Furthermore I will examine how this thesis allows Heidegger to develop a global
understanding of how the essence of technology functions in the modem world.
The thesis of the unity of etemal recun-ence and will to power is most clearly set
out in a text from 1939 called the Eteniat recurrence ofthe same and the wilÏ to power.
This text made up the two concluding lectures to the Lectures. (N I, N II and N III) but
was neyer delivered. The unity of the two concepts is also apparent in the essay
Nietzsche ‘s rnetaphysics and so this text will also serve as a basis for the construction of
my reading.
2.1 Heide2er’s thesis of the unity of the etemnal mecummence of the same and the will
to power.
There are dues that show us that the will to power and the etemal recurrence of
the same are thoughts that are strongly connected for Nietzsche. A first due can be
found in aphomism 1067 of the Witt to power in which Nietzsche affimms that « Ibis world
is at bottom will to power-and nothing else besides.» In an older version of this
aphomism, Nietzsche had affimmed that this world is the world that he wills, the world of
the etemnal recurrence of the same. (For full reference see note 31) These dues tell us
that Nietzsche himself considered these two concepts as perhaps the most important
concepts of his philosophy. In the reception of Nietzsche’s thought this unity (or this
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relation of importance) that Nietzsche saw between the wilI to power and eternal
recurrence has flot aiways been respected. On the one hand, Bauemler57 tried to
completely deny the importance of the eternal recurrence of the same in Nietzsche’s
thought by denigrating it as a simple myth or an enor on Nietzsche’s part. On the other
hand, Karl Loewith authored a study58 in which he priviledged the etemal recurrence of
the same without making any deep metaphysical links between this concept and the will
to power.
Heidegger’s fundamental contribution to this debate is to have established that
there must be a unity between the etemal recurrence and the wiIl to power. I don’t think
this fact lias really been contested in the litterature after Heidegger’s interpretation
(except maybe in Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche that is explicitly anti-Heideggerian and
that refuses to see in the etemal recurrence of the same a thought that pertains to the
totality of being). Deleuze also sees a profound tink between the wiII to power and the
etemal recurrence and this is perhaps a place where Heidegger lias left bis mark on the
Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche.
I would like to critically examine now Heidegger’s interpretation of the unity
between the wiIl to power and the eternal recurrence of the same. Heidegger’s thesis
about this unity is flot explained very thoroughly in bis Nietzsche lectures. In fact two
quotes may be given to summarize Heidegger’s interpretation of the unity of these
Nietzschean concepts:
(Nietzsche der Phitosoph und Potitiker, dritte Auflage, Leipzig, Phillip Reclam Verlag, 1931)
58Nietzsche ‘s phitosophy ofthe eternal recurrence ofthe saine ; Translated by J. Harvey Lomax ; Foreword
by Bernd Magnus. Berkeley ; London University of California Press, c1997.
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WiIl to power may now be conceived of as the permanentizing of
surpassment, that is, of Becoming; hence as a transformed determination
of the guiding metaphysical projection. The etemal recurrence of the
same unfuris and displays its essence, so to speak, as the most constant
permanentizing of the Becoming of what is constant.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, Etemal recurrence of the same and will to
power, p.167)
In another quote Heidegger shows the unification that he operates between will to power
and eternal recurrence of the same:
From the outset, the etemal recurrence of the same and will to power are
grasped as fundamental determinations of beings as such and as a whole
wiIl to power as the peculiar coinage of « what-being » at the histonc end,
and eternal recurrence of the same as the coinage of « that-being ».
(Heidegger, NietzscÏte, Vol.3, Eternal recun-ence and will to power,
p.l68)
Heidegger does something like a genealogy of the Was-sein and the Dass-sein in the
history of metaphysics (especially in Plato and Aristotie). If I understand Heidegger’s
position correctly, the wiII to power and eternal recurrence of the same constitute a unity
because these two thoughts constantly refer both to being and becoming. Heidegger
sometimes seems to want to identify the wiIl to power with becoming and the eternal
recurrence with being. But what allows Heidegger to affirm that wiII to power and
eternal recurrence say the selfsame thing is the fact that there is a relation between the
will to power, etemal recurrence and the permanentization of becoming. The account
given by Heidegger here is not clear, if will to power seems to be sometimes identified
with becoming, it also is the « Being of beings > according to Heidegger’s reading.
Etemal recu;rence seems to be identified with being (< that everything recurs is the
closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being » as Nietzsche puts its)
but it is also an attempt by Nietzsche to unite Being and Becoming, action and reaction
in a single thought. Thus we cannot clearly map becoming to will to power and being to
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etemal recurrence. This would also be surprising since wifl to power corresponds to
essentia and etemal recurrence to existentia and it seems that being and essentia and
becoming and existentia should be paired together rather than the opposite. The only way
to unify the two thoughts together seems to be afforded by noticing that they both refer to
the permanentization of becoming.
2.2 Unity of eternal recurrence of the same and wilI to power as consummation of
metaphysics and transformation into the essence of modem technology.
Heidegger says that philosophy has become cybemetics. (The end oJphiÏosophy
and the task ofthinking) It is plausible to think that according to him metaphysics in its
ultimate transformation becomes technology and positive science. It becomes evident
that what helps Heidegger think through the essence of modem technology is his reading
of Nietzsche. For Heidegger, the will to power establishes perspectives from which an
interpretation of the real becomes possible. These perspectives are established only in
order to allow an augmentation and an overcoming of centers of force that had been
established previously. But what is essential for Heidegger is that perspectives are
established, stabilized and secure a point of view. It is only because of this securing
preservation of the real (a securing that operates in an essential manner in the essence of
modem science and technology) that the mastery and the overcoming of the real become
possible. The will to power is thus essentially a condition of securinglpreservation and
enhancement. Technology preserves but only to stabilize a point of view from which it
may develop an infinite and absolute intensification.
The will to power contains the etemal recun-ence within itself because it is
preservation and hence stabilization of the unstable and enhancement. Will to power
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represents (vorstetlt), etemal recurrence of the same stabilizes, positions and presents
(stelÏt) beings and the real. The Vorstettung and the Stellung that is operated by both
these concepts is unified in the notion of Ge-steit. Why is there metaphysical unification
of will to power and eternal recurrence and not (metaphysical) identification?
Science is according to Heidegger the theory of the real. Heidegger explains this
definition by looking at the etymologies of theory and real. Heidegger is clear on the fact
that ancient science understood as theoria is radically different from our modem science,
but he does see a histonc continuity between ancient science and modem science. The
connection between Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche and his concept of technology is
more clearly seen if we focus on his notion of SeiizsgeschicÏzte. The essence of
technology is understood by Heidegger as an unconcealing destining ( unverbergeizdes
Geschick). The Geschick or the destiny is what sends and makes possible a mode of
revealing and unconcealment. The essence of technology is a Geschick des Seins, a
destining or sending of Being that reveals Being as Gesteil or enframing.
It is Reiner Schuermann’s59 thesis that the wiII to power, the etemal recurrence of
the same, nihiiism, Uebermensch, justice and revaluation of ail values although
formally Nietzsche’s concepts, materially articulate the essence of technology. On this
reading, the preceding Iist of concepts are no longer Nietzschean concepts but
Heideggerian categories. More specifically, they are the categories that correspond to
the determinate epoch in which Being reveals itself as Gesteti. More importantly, the
categories are technological and retrospective. Schurmann daims that what he calls a
categorial phenomenology is the best way to account for both the history of Being and
Heidegger on Being and acting froin priitciptes to aitarchy, see Bibliography for full reference.
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the analytic of Dasein60. Schurmann’s discussion is rather intricate and I only discuss his
position here because he has most clearly artïculated how starting from his Nietzsche
reading, Heidegger has developed an interpretation of the essence of modem technology
and I wish to distinguish my conclusions from his reading. Thus, I wiIl focus on the
aspects of Schurmann’s discussion that are directly relevant to the thesis of the unity of
the will to power and etemal recurrence of the same and to the daim that the will to
power, nihilism, etemal recurrence, Uebernzensch, justice though speaking formally
about Nietzsche, mateiially articulate the essence of modem technology. On the whole,
I think that Schuermann is right in his daim that Nietzsche (read via Juenger, something
Schuermann forgets to mention. Juenger provides Heidegger with the quasi-theological
language of the sacral and salvific aspects of modem technology) allows Heidegger to
find the vocabulary necessary to articulate the essence of modem technology. The
question of who is more important between Nietzsche and Juenger for the development
of Heidegger ‘s concept of technology is perhaps not easy to answer if we absolutely seek
to ascribe priority to one of those thinkers. It is perhaps simpler to think that Nietzsche
and Juenger are complementary for Heidegger: one could be seen as the engine
(Nietzsche) and the other as the fuel (Juenger) that aliment Heidegger ‘s reading of
technology.
In the details, I find Schuermann’ s analysis overly complex and do not think
that this complexity always clarifies Heidegger’s positions. My thesis is that the essence
of modem technology and Heidegger’ s reading of Nietzsche are both thinkable in terms
In order to show this, Schuermann analyzes the history of Being in terms of three kinds ofcategories:
prospective categories, retrospective categories and transitional categories. The prospective categories are
those ofEon, Phusis, Aletheia, Logos, Hen and Nous. The retrospective categories have already been
Iisted above. The transitional categories are ontological difference/world and thing, ‘there is’/favor,
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of the concept of representation. Representation is what is common both to Heidegger’ s
interpretation of the unity of the etemal recurrence and will to power and to bis reading of
technology and modem science. Science is a theory of the real. Insofar as it is a theory
of the real, science must represent the real. It must posit certain representations as
stable. From these representations, advances can be made. Science and technology, just
like the will to power, tries to enhance its representations, to make them more
descriptive and more powerful. But in order to enhance, one must also be able to
stabilize. This is where the etemal recurrence comes in as a condition of preservation of
perspectives and representations. Etemal recurrence stabilizes perspectives and
representations and will to power enhances them. But Heidegger (following Nietzsche)
daims that the conditions of enhancement of life are aiways at the same time conditions
of preservation. (N II, S.268, German version) Thus, the unity of the will to power and
the etemal recurrence is what does the fundamental work necessary to help Heidegger
articulate the essence of modem technology. In my opinion the other categories,
nihilism, justice and Uebernzensch also play an important role but they do flot form the
core of Heidegger’s argument.
The influence of Nietzsche’s metaphysics on Heidegger was buttressed with bis
admiration and interest in the work of Ernst Juenger. Heidegger daims that he studied
the Totale Mobitmachung in a reading group with Wemer Broecker and « attempted to
show how in them [in Juenger’s Arbeiter and Totale MobiÏnzachungJ an essential
comprehension of Nietzsche’s metaphysics is expressed, insofar as the history of the
contemporary situation of the West is seen and foreseen in the horizon of this
metaphysics. » (Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universitaet/Das Rektorat 1933-
unconcealmentlevent of appropriation, epochlclearing, nearness/fourfold, correspondinglthinking.
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1934, p.24). Juenger’s influence on Heidegger’s notion of the essence of technology is
present in the possibility of a sacrality, suggested by Juenger, that could be associated
with technology. When Heidegger speaks of technology as the greatest danger but also
as the saving power echoes of Juenger are heard in this quasi-theological way of
articulating the being of technology. Juenger speaks of technology as of « the most
decisive anti-Chnstian power » and, in general, it seerns like he wishes to mix the three
planes of organic, mechanic and theological discourse.
The worker (DerArbeiter) is the main figure of Juenger’s manifesto-like
discourse. He is the shape (Gestalt) that embodies modem technology. Through the
worker, total mobilization of the earth is achieved and the limits between war and peace
are erased. As put by a contemporary Russian commentator, Alexandr Dughin61: ‘tWe
are taiking about a special type of modem man, which in a most critical expenence of
profane reality, being at the very heart of technocratic soulless mechanism, in the iron
bowels of totalitanan war or hellish industrial labor, in the center of nihilism of the
twentieth century, finds in himself a mysterious fuicrum, which takes him to the other
side of “nothingness,” to the elements of spontaneously awakened inner sacrality.”
Dughin Alexandr, Date of access 17.09.2005,
This sacrality is not shared by
Heidegger if it is something conceived as emanating from human subjectivity. For
Heidegger, the sacred and salvific aspects of the essence of technoÏogy corne from the
fact that it is a sending or destining of Being (GescÏzick des Seins) and only secondarily
6! Dughin is a difficuit to circumscribe author. He has been characterized by some as a fascist, but he also
has inclinations towards traditionalism, esotericism, millenarism and fundamentalism (including ot the
Islamic type). Thus, I dissociate myseif from his most radical and extreme positions. I do think however
that he has useful insight into the nature of Ernst Juenger’s theories and writings.
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from the fact that man as subject may receive or correspond to this unconcealing sending
(unverbergende Geschick). V
It is important to understand that for Heidegger technology is flot a purely
theoretical way in which Western man approaches being. In the epoch of technology,
the gap between theory and practice bas been transcended, deconstructed. When Being
is grasped representationally, this constitutes a political way of being of Western man.
The essence of modem technology is an essentially ambiguous phenomenon for
Heidegger. (“Das Wesen der Technik ist in einem hohen Sinne zweideutig “, Vortraege
und Aufsaetze, S.29. «Then it appears to us that essence of technology is ambiguous in
an elevated sense », my translation) Heidegger is opposed to the view that technology is
a neutral power. However, he does flot view it as something demonic or diabolical. For
him, there could be a freeing aspect of the essence of technology. As he says: «On the
contrary when we open ourselves properly to the essence of technology, we find
ourselves caught, in an unhoped for way, in a liberating cail. » ( “1m Gegenteil: wenn
wir uns dem Wesen der Technik eigens oeffnen, finden wir uns unverhofft in einen
befreienden Anspruch genommen.” Vortraege und Aufsaetze, 5.29, my translation)
Heidegger develops an understanding of technology that rests on a
phenomenological analysis of the instrumental and causal understanding of technology as
a means. The four causes discovered by Aristotie : the final, efficient, formaI, and
material causes are found to have a deeper grounding in poiesis, production. But
production consists according to Heidegger in bringing something forth from
concealment into unconcealment. Production is thus grounded in unconcealment and the
well-known concept of truth as aletheia that is associated to it by Heidegger. But what is
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entirely original to Heidegger’s analysis is his development of a vocabulary that allows
him to understand the re’ation of the essence of technology to nature. This anal ysis rests
heavily on the cognates vor-stellen, stellen and be-stellen. Science and technology
attempt to represent nature and the real. This attempt at representation is neyer entirely
successful because there is aiways something that cannot be made present in
representation. This something ïs what Heidegger calis the Unumgaengtiche.
But what is more relevant is that instead of being represented, nature is pro
voked (Ïzerausgefoerdert) and demands are made upon it. The essence of technology
makes demands upon (stettt) and commits (besteUt) nature and the real. Nature becomes
an inventory (Bestand) of objects that need to be stored, transformed, stockpiled and
used up. The question arises of who is responsible for this stockpiling and provocation:
is it man himself? Heidegger answers the question in the negative. Man qua nature is
much more a resource that can be stockpiled and used up for labor, production, genetic
material, body parts... Heidegger’s answer is rather that the problem of technology is of
an epochal nature. We live in the epoch of the Stellung and of the Gesteit. Being reveals
itself, unconceals itself and beings in the process, in the unity of the Gesteil.
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3 Critique of phi1o1oicaI and conceptual coency of Heideer’s readin of
Nietzsche.
Ibis section is dedicated to probe the philological and conceptual rigor of Heidegger’s
reading by focusing on aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that the Heideggerian reading bas
perhaps occluded or overshadowed. I would like to defend the thesis that Heidegger has
perhaps made too littie of the themes of freedom and transcendence in Nietzsche’s
thought.
3.1 Summary of Heideger’s Nietzsche interpretation from the perspective to
eternal recurrence.
Heidegger commits certain important strategic decisions with respect to bis
interpretation of Nietzsche. These strategies have been analyzed and studied at length by
various authors. The most violent thesis that Heidegger expounds with respect to
Nietzsche is that Nietzsche does flot overcome traditional metaphysics but only
completes it. This thesis constitutes the essence of the Heideggerian position with respect
to Nietzsche. It can be easily summarized by exhibiting a few strategic moves made by
Heidegger. The first strategy consists in affirming that the will to power is the Being of
beings.
This thesis is elaborated with more subtlety when Heidegger affirms that the wiIl
to power constitutes the essentia (the quidditas, the Dass) of beings and that the etemal
recurrence of the same constitutes the existentia (the quornodo, the Wie). It is
interesting to note that Heidegger seems to install a dialectic between will to power and
the etemal recurrence of the same by associating them with the terms of essentia and
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existentia. This ments a more detailed analysis and we shah return to it later. (See pp.86-
87).
The next step in the Heideggerian interpretation consists in the establishment of a
link between the will to power, the Being of beings and the concept of value. Heidegger
affirms in the Word of Nietzsche: «God is dead» (Holzwege) that the will to power
reduces Being to thinking in values. This thinking in values (Denken im Werte) would
not, according to Heidegger, let Being be. The concept of value is connected by
Nietzsche to the concept of life and to its conditions of preservation and enhancement.
But this selfsame concept of value is related by Nietzsche to the will to power because it
is only through the value-positings of the will to power that conditions can be posed that
preserve and enhance life. What affirms life or negates it is always the will to power.
However, Heidegger arrives at the conclusion already established in 1.4 Heidegger ‘s
interpretation ofthe Nietzschean concept of nïhiÏisnz and his appropriation ofthat
concept, that for Nietzsche the Being of beings and truth have become values.
Heidegger ‘s third interpretative moment cornes in The word of Nietzsche: «God
is dead» (Hotzwege), when he connects the two preceding moments to the concepts of
the Ueberntensch and etemal recurrence of the same. Thus what distinguishes man from
Uebennensch is the epistemology of the wihl to power. The Uebermensch is aware that he
is in his essence will to power and that the world, in its essence, is nothing else besides
the will to power. But it is this cognitive disposition, this supplement of knowledge that
distinguishes Uebennensch from man and that prepares him to dominion over the earth.
The Uebermensch goes beyond humanity as it has existed up to now and disposes himself
to global domination by affirming that his essence as well as the essence of beings is
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nothing else besides the will to power.
Thus cornes to the fore the third moment ofHeidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation:
the suspiciously looking daim that Nietzsche does flot overcome metaphysical
subjectivity but rather affirms it in the strongest way that has yet been articulated in the
history of metaphysics. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche woutd be more coherent
than both Descartes and Hegel and also more radical in bis affirmation of subjectivity by
reducing it to pure willing. Let us forget for a moment Nietzsche’s famous word
according to which the metaphysical subject is nothing but a grammatical invention and
let us take Heidegger’s thesis seriously.
The Uebermensch would be the one that according to his essence which is the will
to power posits values that affirm or negate life. This would seem to imply an unbound
subjectivism on Nietzsche’s part. We must now examine the relationship between the
Uebermensch and the eternal recurrence ofthe same. Heidegger develops this link
principally in Who is Nietzsches’ Zarathustra but he uses similar arguments in W7iat is
caïÏed thinking (Lessons 9 and 10). In What is caÏÏed thinking, Heidegger flnally
manages to think the essence of Nietzsche’ s thought of eternal recurrence of the same.
Heidegger affirms that Nietzsche’ s essential thought is that of etemal recurrence62.
Heidegger concludes that Nietzsche’s ultimate goal is to redeem man from the
spirit of vengeance. This spirit of vengeance is in its essence metaphysical and flot
62 On page 20 of the german edition of Ws heisst Denken (Max Niemyer Verlag, 1971), Heidegger writes:
“Dieses Werk Nietzsches (Thus spoke Zarathustra, PC.) denkt den einzigen Gedaiiken dieses Denkers:
den Gedanken der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen. Jeder Denker denkt nur einen einzigen Gedanken.”
We may think that this einzigen Gedanken corresponds to Heidegger’s Sein but this is flot certain. We
have to contrast what Heidegger says in WHD with what he said in 1936 about etemal recurrence:
Nietzsches’ gewakiger Versuch Seyn und Werden gleich wesentlich in eins zu denken’, ‘in die Sackgasse
der Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkunfi’ geraten sei. (Vortrag Europa und die Deutsche philosophie,
8.4.1936, quoted by Mueller-Lauter, Nietzsche-Heidegger, p.6. note 17).
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affective and psychological and is understood by Nietzsche in relation to his concept of
the etemal recurrence of the same. The spirit of vengeance is characterized by « the
will’s iii will against time and its «it was» (Des Willes Widerwille gegen die Zeit und
sein « es war »).
By characterizing the spirit of revenge as this opposition of the will to the passage
of time, Heidegger will reconstruct the argument of etemal recurrence in a totally
original way by comparison to his treatment of this same concept in the Nietzsche
courses of the 30s. I will try to reconstruct the Heideggerian argument. Heidegger begins
by asserting that Nietzsche thinks the spirit of vengeance with respect to the Being of
beings. In order to support this assertion, Heidegger examines the treatment of the Being
of beings in German Ideatism and in particular in Schelling. Heidegger insists on the fact
that the word Witte does flot signify or mean a capacity of the human spirit but that the
will is related to the Being of beings . Heidegger then affirms that Leibniz with his
notions of perceptio and appetitus already thought of Being as will.
The reconstruction of the « proof » of eternal recurrence is not conducted along
the same unes as in the Nietzsche lecture courses of 1936-40. This time eternal
recurrence is introduced through an examination of the concept of will and the way in
which this concept is related to time. At a crucial moment in the reconstruction
Heidegger introduces telle quelle Schelling’s thesis according to which will is primordial
being. This makes Heidegger’s reconstruction difficuit to defend. I am affirming this
because it is well-known that Nietzsche was very opposed to the concepts of will and
being at least in his mature works. However, we will follow here Heidegger’s argument
in order to better circumscribe and criticize it later. Heidegger begins by affirming that
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the will becomes free with respect to what revoits it when it becomes free as will. This
means that the wiIl is free for the going in the becoming (for the movement that is
associated with becoming), but the kind of going that does not stray far from the will but
rather brings back what was gone (had left). This constitutes the first step in the
reconstruction of the proof of the etemal recurrence of the same.
In a second step, Heidegger affirms that the will becomes free with respect to
what is revolting in the «it was »( «Es war ») when this selfsame will wills the retum of
each «it was ». Furthermore, Heidegger affirms that the will wills its own eternity. But
at this crucial moment in the argumentation, Heidegger introduces Schelling’s thesis
according to which the will is primordial being (in this daim of Schelling’s that will is
primordial being there is a direct reference to God as the primordial being), a thesis that
Nietzsche does flot share priinafacie. Once this is done, Heidegger concludes with his
own version of the etemal recurrence of the same, that is that « the primal being of
Beings is the wiJl, as the etemally recurrent willing of the eternal recurrence of the
same » but also his own thesis according to which «The etemal recurrence of the same is
the supreme triumph of the metaphysics of the will that etemally wills its own willing »63•
Heidegger operates a “hegelianization” (or a “metaphycization”) of Nietzschean
concepts. First, he installs a dialectic between the will to power (essentia) and the eternal
recurrence of the same (existentia). The will to power corresponds to an « immer mehr»
understood as the essence of Being in the age of technology. This essence is thought
indifferently as the essence of man and the essence of things man is reified (Lukacs),
thingified in the network of machine-economy but in the same way the Gegenstand
63 (Sce reference in tirst part, section 1.3 Nietzsclte’s notion ofeternat recurrence ofthe saine and its
connection to Hie wllt to power p.35 of this essay)
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(object) is addressed, provoked and becomes Bestand, i.e. it is understood solely and
exclusively as what can be used or manipulated by man in order to allow him to extend
bis planetary domination. Man himself becomes the resource that bas the highest value.
(See the texts Overcoming metaphysics and The ciuestion conceming technology.)
The dialectization and reduction to a unity of Nietzsche’s thought is constituted
by the fact that the real is stabilized in the face of the essential instability of the will to
power through the etemal recurrence of the same:
Etemal recurrence of the same is the way in which the impermanent (that
which becomes) as such cornes to presence; it cornes to presence in the
highest form of permanence (in circling), with the sole determination of
securing its possibility to be empowered...
The same that recurs has only relative stability and is therefore essentially
unstable. Its recurrence however, signifies a continuai bringing back into
stability, that is, a permanentizing. Etemal recurrence is the most
constant permanentizing of the unstable.
(Heidegger, Nietzsctze, Vol.3, p.2l2., Farell-KrelI translation).
That which becomes is the will to power and its constructs of domination
(Herrschaftsgebilde). That which is, is the etemat recurrence of the same.
Impermanence (becoming as will to power) is secured and stabilized in permanence
(being as etemal recurrence of the same ) so that from this stage of permanence a new
becoming can ensue (a new wilI to power with new configurations of force and new
enhancements of power)64. Politically, regimes are established through struggies for
power and they are then stabilized and permanentized through the rhetonc of etemal
64 Guenter Abel (Die Dynainik der Witten zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr, 1984) reads the teaching
of eternal recurrence as characterized by the fact that the world is considered from the point of view of
becoming as opposed to being and that ail existence (Dasein) cannot be devalued and does flot need to be
justified. For Abel, the thought of recurrence resolves ail the renewed post-modern dualisms of gnostic
metaphysics. Abel believes that a scientific proof of the thought of recurrence is flot possible because a
thought lies, in terms of horizon and worid-opening prospect, before the possibility of empirical
experience and theory development. However, he believes that the thought of recurrence must stand to
scientific scrutifly and that it cannot be a mere existential fable.
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recurrence.65 Thus being and becoming are thought of as dialectical moments of each
other in a way similar to Hegel. This Hegelianization and dialectization of Nietzsche’s
thought is an original insight of Heidegger’s interpretation. The will to power and the
etemal recurrence of the same are thus interpreted by Heidegger as being part of a
dialectic and of a unity.
But Heidegger does not stop there his “dialectization of Nietzsche’s thought”.
The will to power is not conceptualized by Heidegger as a play of forces and chaotic
surfaces that tends only toward its own expansion and overcoming. For Heidegger, the
will to power establishes perspectives from which an interpretation of the real becomes
possible. These perspectives are established only in order to allow an expansion and an
overcoming of the center of forces that was previously established. But what is essential
for Heidegger is the fact that the perspectives are established, stabilized and secure a
point of view. It is only because of this preservative securing of the real (a securing that
operates essentially in the Being of technology and modem science) that the mastery and
overcoming of the real becomes possible.
The will to power is thus essentially a condition of securinglpreservation and of
overcoming. But this characterization of the will to power can only remind us of the
Hegelian Aufliebung although the emphasis is changed and what matters a lot more for
Nietzsche is overcoming and expansion rather than preservation. In a similar way, the
etemal recurrence is dialectized although in a non-explicit way by Heidegger66.
Certain critics have remarked that the Uebermensch might represent an
See article by Don Dombowsky, The Rhetoric ofLegitiniation, in Journal ofNietzsche studies, Issue 14.
66 (See my own interpretation of this concept in the section 2.3 Critique of Heidegger’s reading of
Nietzsche: eterna! recurrence ofthe saine and the concepts offreedom and transcendence.)
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Aufliebung of man as he has existed up to the present.67 As far as I know,
Heidegger neyer speaks of Aufizebung when referring to the Uebermensch or any other
Nietzschean concept. Nietzsche himsetf uses the terni Uebetwindung (overcoming) of
man through the Uebernzensch (See Titus spoke Zarathustra, Prologue and first part).
On the other hand, it is true that Heidegger dialectizes the Ueberrnensch by interpreting
hmm as the culmination of rationatitas that is attributed to Hegel into the bestial itas of
aniinatitas attributed to Nietzsche. The Uebermensch overcomes the rationality of
absolute Geist (Spirit) but he also preserves it through the fact that he transposes
Hegelian rationality into the body and into the bioogical. This transposition reverses the
privileged position of the spirit in Hegel by that of the body in Nietzsche (See Thus spoke
Zarathustra : The contempters of the body). The life-philosophy (Lebensphilosophie) for
Heidegger is nothing else but the transposition of the unconditional subjectivity of
German Idealism in the domain of the corporeal or the biological.
The absolutization and totalization of reason was already begun in Hegel’s work
since the body conceived as the last possibility of the spirit of thinking itself in its totality
by absorbing its negative was already conceptualized at the end of Hegel’s Philosophy of
Nature. However, in Nietzsche’s work the will is thought in a deeper and more radical
way according to Heidegger since Nietzsche radicalizes the importance of the will by
changing the emphasis from the rationality of Geist to the vitality of the body and of the
(Diego Sanchez Meca, Perspectivas actuates de interpretacion det Uebermensch ,zietzscheano,
Publicado en ER. Revista de filosofla, Sevilla, no. 14, 1999/1) En primer lugar, la perspectiva constrictiva
y reductora de la historia de la metaffsica impone et punto de vista de que las ideas de Nietzsche se
establecen sobre la base de una inversién-conservacién (Aufbebung) de Jas posiciones metaffsicas que le
preceden inmediatamente en el tiempo, o sea, sepin Heidegger, de las de Regel. Et superhombre deberâ
entenderse, pues, como Aufhebung del pensamiento dcl sujeto absoluto de Regel.
78
will to power. In Heidegger’s own words:
In Hegel’s metaphysics, the subjectivity of reason is elaborated to the
point of its absoluteness. As the subjectivity of absolute representation, it
of course acknowledges sensuous certainty and corporeal self
consciousness, but only in order to absorb them into the absoluteness of
absolute spirit and thus simply to deny them any possibility of absolute
preeminence. To the extent that in the absolute subjectivity of reason the
extreme counterpossibility of the absolute and essential dominance of an
independent, seif-commanding wiÏÏ is excluded, the subjectivity of
absolute spirit is indeed absolute, but still essentially incomplete. Only its
inversion to the subjectivity of will to power exhausts the final essential
possibility of Being as subjectivity.
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volumes 3-4, p.225, Nietzsche’s metaphysics)68
Thus, according to Heidegger, subjectivity ïs absolute in Hegel’s thought but because it
suppresses (aufhebt) the bodily in the absolute knowledge of the spiritual, it does flot
allow an unconditional Wesensherrschaft (essential domination) of the will’s
commanding of itself out of itself. For these reasons Hegel’s absolute subjectivity
remains an incomplete subjectivity (unvollendete Subjektivitaet ) and does flot exhaust
the final essential possibility of Being as subjectivity.
3.2 Analysis of philological and conceptual cogency of Heideger ‘s reading of
Nietzsche
When approaching Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, it is important to state that
Heidegger is mainly interested in Nietzsche insofar as he throws light on the rest of the
western philosophical tradition and helps us to think through our own present histoncal
68 In der Metaphysik Hegels wird die Subjektivitaet der Vernunft in ihre Unbedingtheit ausgearbeitet. Ais
die Subjektivitaet des unbedingten Vorsteilens hat sie zwar die sinniiiche Gewissheit und das ieibliche
Selbstbewusstsein anerkannt, dies aber nur um sie in die Unbedingtheit des absoluten Geistes aufiuheben
und ihnen so jede Moeglichkeit eines unbedingten Vorrangs schlechthin zu bestreiten. Sofern in der
unbedingten Subjektivitaet der Vernunft die auesserste Gegenmoeglichkeit einer unbedingten
Wesensherrschaft des sich aus sich befehienden Wiilens ausgeschiossen bleibt, ist die Subjektivitaet des
absoluten Geistes eine zwar unbedingte, aber auch noch wesenhaft unvoilendete Subjektivitaet. (Heidegger,
Nietzsche 2, S.302, Nietzsches Metaphysik)
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(historiai: geshichtliche: Geschick) position.69 As is so well put by Otto Poeggeler:
Die frage, die Heidegger entwickelt, giit vielmehr der Weise, wie
Nietzsche sich in der Ueberlieferung des abendlaendischen Denkens haelt,
wie sein Denken von dieser Ueberlieferung bestimmt wird und seinerseits
sie bestimmt, mag Nietzsche das eigens erfahren und wissen oder nicht.
(Otto Poeggeler, Mathit Heidedeggers Denkweg, S. 109)
The criticisms repeated]y leveled against Heïdegger’s Nietzsche are well-known.
Heidegger does not take seriously Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics. By essentializing
the thought of the wiII to power as the Being of beings, Heidegger commits an extreme
interpretative violence onto the Nietzschean text. When everything is weighed out, I
believe these criticisms to be justified. Nietzsche does flot onty remain at the level of the
beingness of Beings: there is an opposition by this thinker to ail thinking of Being. This
is the case because Nietzsche is Heraclitean (in a superficial way Heidegger might reply)
andjust as Hegel he thinks Being predominantty from the side of becoming. Heidegger
might reply that this becoming is only that of beings and neyer that of Being. For his
part, Nietzsche understands Being as a platonic fabrication. Heidegger identifies a quote
in the Nietzschean corpus where this opposition to Being seems to be overcome:
[Rekapitulation]
Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins aufzupraegen-das ist der hoechste
Wille zur Macht. Zwiefache faelschung, von den Sinnen her und vom
Geiste her, um eine Wett des Seienden zu erhalten, des Verharrenden,
Gieichwertigen, usw. Dass ailes wiederkehrt, ist die extremste
Annaehrung einer Welt des Werdens an die des Seins: Gipfel der
Betrachtung.
Wilte zurliacht, 617, Nietzsche Friedrich.
Recapitulation. To stamp Becoming with the character of Being- that is
the supreme wiIl to power. Twofold falsification, one by the senses, the
other by the mmd, in order to preserve a world of being, of perdurance,
69 In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger makes a somewhat different usage of Nietzsche insofar as he refers to the
latter’s second untimely mediation. My daim is mainly directed at Heidegger’s later reading ofNietzsche
that begins with the Nietzsche lectures.
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of equivalence, etc. That everything recurs is the closest approximation of
a world of Becoming to one of Being : peak of the meditation.
(Quoted by Heidegger in Nietzsche 3, p.213, Translated by Farreil Krell)
But a single quote is flot sufficient to overcome ail of Nietzsche’s effort to think
becoming and the world of the Itic et nuizc in opposition to the world of Being. In this
sense there is nothing perhaps so revealing as the text How tÏze true world uttinzately
became afable. I am giving the totality of the text because I believe it is essential to
understand Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche:
1. The true world -- attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous
man; he lives in it, lie is it.(The oldest form of the idea, relatively
sensible, simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence,
ttJ Plato, ani the truth.”)
2. The true world
-- unattainable for now, but promised for the sage,
the pïous, the virtuous man (‘for the sinner who repents”).
(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious,
incomprehensible
-- it becornesfemale, it becomes Christian.)
3. The true world -- unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but
the very thought of it -- a consolation, an obligation, an imperative.
(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The
idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, Kinigsbergian [i.e.,
Kantian].)
4. The true world
-- unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being
unattained, also mtknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming,
or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us? (Gray
moming. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.)
5. The “true” world
-- an idea which is no longer good for anything,
flot even obligating
-- an idea which has become useless and
superfluous
-- coizsequentty, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!
(Bnght day; breakfast; retum of bon sens [“good sense”] and
cheerfulness; Plato’s embarrassed blush; pandemonium of ail free
spi ri ts.)
6. The true world -- we have abolished. What world has remained?
The apparent one perhaps? But no! WitÏz tue true world we have also
abolisÏzed the apparent oize.
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high
81
point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA. [“Zarathustra
begins”]) Nietzsche, Friedrich, TwiÏight of the idots.
As Heidegger writes in his analysis of this paragraph, Nietzsche is aware
that the abolition of Platonism must undergo an inversion but that this inversion
cannot leave in place the two schemes of the sensuous and the supersensuous
simply unchanged. It is the case that the transformation of the platonic scheme by
Nietzsche must open new possibilïties of thought but these new possibilities
cannot remain under the scheme of the inversion of platonism. Nietzsche was
aware that he was operating a transformation of the platonic scheme through his
concept of inversion/transvaluation of values (Umwertung aller Werte). What
Nietzsche was flot aware of is that this abolition of the christian-platonic
transcendence and its partial recuperation in the etemal recurrence of the will to
power would constitute in a historiaI way the present position of the reign of the
essence of technology. The Gesteli and the Bestaizd are only thinkable through a
confrontation with Nietzsche’s thought.
The problem of christian morality and transcendence is related to the problem of
the will to truth in Nietzsche. It is in this metaphysical will to truth thatjudgments of
value originate. The will to truth has a christian origin according to Nietzsche: this will
finds its origin in the chnstian value of honesty that gives birth to the intellectual rigor of
the scientific and the over-evaluation of truth of the metaphysician. But Nietzsche
commits certain distorsions in his critique of the metaphysical in itself ( an sich ) or
transcendence. He unites the platonic concept of truth and transcendence t the world of
ideas ) to christian psychology. Nietzsche operates a synthesis: according to his famous
expression christianism is platonism for the masses. But in this synthesis Nietzsche unites
$2
two different tendencies: the christian desire of transcendence, the belief in a beyond
(the reaim or kingdom of Christ ) that could replace the hic et izunc and transcendence as
it was conceived of by Plato that is starting from the ideas (the realm of ideas or of the
intelligibles ).
Nietzsche does not simply invert platonism as Heidegger seems to affirm
sometimes: he operates a synthesis between platonism and christianity7° in order to then
attempt to invert that synthesis. But to understand Nietzsche’s thought well, it must be
seen that the critique of platonism and christianity cannot be uniform. Christianity attacks
the life of the here-and-under by proposing a beyond capable of redeeming the injustices
and iniquities suffered in the here and now. Nietzsche replicates that christianity is
against tife, that it devalues the life of the here and now, that it ( christianity ) is nihilistic
because it posits values that de-value the life of the here-and-under in favor of a beyond.
On the other hand, platonism posits the notion of truth that transcends the here and now.
This truth of the ideas allows us, according to Plato to understand the life of the here
and-under. It is only by orienting ourselves towards the world of the ideas, a world that
transcends our world that we can understand our own immanent world. This time, it is in
the domain of the platonic epistemology that Nietzsche identifies nihilistic tendencies.
According to him, it is necessary to understand the worldliness of our lower world
starting from itself and without referring to transcending (and perhaps transcendental)
entities such as the platonic ideas. (See commentary to the History of a fable above).
Nietzsche thus accuses Plato in the same way as christianity of being nihilistic since the
ideas are said by Nietzsche to be against life. Every time we attempt to understand the
° Perhaps this synthesis had already been operated by Augustine and by the historical embedding of of the
language and concepts of Christianity with those of Platonism, but Nietzsche re-articulates the unity
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lower world ( the here-and-under, the ici-bas, the Diesseitige) starting from a
transcending entity, we reduce the immanent potentialities of this lower world.
The physiological, animated potential of a living being can only be
reduced if an attempt is made to understand it starting from the platonic idea. The
platonic ideas are, in the same sense as the christian beyond against life. But a
distinction must be made between the psychological nihilism of the christian and the
epistemological nihilism of the platonist that Nietzsche seems to want to reduce to the
same thing. Nietzsche also cnticizes the overvaluation of the notion of the Good in the
platonic and christian ethics. The values of altruism, of seif-denial, charity and
disinterest are not natural according to Nietzsche but rather against nature and against
life. By being against the affects of force, cruelty and violence that take root in the will
to power, the affects that are positively evaluated by the christian and platonic moralities
are also accused of being nihilistic. The «bad» affects are at the origin of the bad
conscience that I have already mentioned above. Nietzsche hopes to be able to overcome
nihilism by, among other things, «naturalising » the bad affects and dissipating the
illusion of conscience (in the sense of Bewusstsein and Gewissen ) that exists by
exhibiting the sub-stratum of the bad conscience and the bad affects that constitute this
conscience (GeneaÏogy of ,noraÏs, second essay, last paragraphs).
The first criticism inveighed against Heidegger’s conceptual reconstruction of
Nietzsche is how to believe in an interpretative strategy that instalis the will to power as
the Being of beings whereas Nietzsche squarely rejects ail thought of Being as a residue
of metaphysics. The second cnticism that can be ieveled against Heidegger is a counter
between Platonism and Christianity onty to radically undo it.
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criticism. Whereas Heidegger asserts that the wiII to power becomes wiII to wilI and only
affirms nihilism which consists in the fact that in the history of metaphysics there is
nothing to (with) Being, we can assert that Nietzsche had strong reservations with
respect to the concept of will. Heidegger would thus be wrong in trying to reduce the
will to power to the will of the metaphysical subject since Nietzsche had already rejected
this possibility in his posthumously published writings on the wilI to power.
I will only refer to those paragraphs in the WilÏ to power where this is most
obvious (section 668 « . . .There is no such thing as «willing », but only a willing
something: one must flot remove the aim from the total condition-as epistemologists do.
«Willing» as they understand it is as littie a reality as « thinking » : it is a pure
fiction
...». section 671 « ... There is no such thing as « wiIl »; it is only a simplifying
conception of understanding as ïs « matter »... ». section 692 « ... My proposition is:
that the will of psychology hitherto is an unjustified generalization, that this wiIl does izot
exist at alt that instead of grasping the idea of the development of one definite will into
many forms, one has eliminated the character of the will by subtracting from it its
content, its « whither? »- this is in the highest degree the case with Schopenhauer:
what he cails « will » is a mere empty word... ). k is important to note that this Iack of
esteem for the wilI of the metaphysical subject is flot new but that this critique of the
metaphysical will goes back to Hurnan alt too hu,nan, runs throughout the Nietzschean
corpus and is also very present in the Genealogy ofmorats and in Beyond good and evil
to quote only some of the most important of Nietzsche’s works. There is perhaps a bit of
a lack of consistency on Nietzsche’s part when one thinks that he allegedly intended to
publish a book called the Wilt (!) to power. But Nietzsche repeats again and again that
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the will to power is flot a wilÏ (flot a uniquely subjective-human will) as bas been
traditionally understood.
One has to be more precise at this particularjuncture. Heidegger’s criticism is
subtie. lie knows very well that the will to power does not represent for Nietzsche the
will of an ordinaiy man. It is precisely this will that Nietzsche attempts to show is an
illusion. But insofar as Heidegger understands the wifl as the Being ofbecoming, as
another way of naming becoming for Nietzsche, he is right to affirm that the will to
power is nothing else but the Being ofbeings. furthermore, the reduction ofthe will to
power to the technological will to wilI is only partially effectuated through a critique of
the wilI to power. One must remembered what Heidegger says with respect to the eternal
recunence ofthe same: « The eternal recurrence ofthe sarne is the supreme triumph of
the metaphysics ofthe will that eternally wills its own willing ». It is through the
unification (why is this flot the same as an identification?) of the eternal recurrence of the
same and the will to power that Heidegger develops lis critique ofNietzsche as a
metaphysician ofthe will. As a lucid commentator bas put it:
As Heidegger joined the will to power and tIc eternal recurrence ofthe
same into one and the same thought he tried to « complete » Nietzsche’s
thinking and to end the Western project known as « metaphysics >71
The will to power is the essentia (the qztidditas) and eternal recurrence is the
existentia (tIc quomodo,). There is perhaps a ground to question tIc identification of
scholastic concepts with Nietzsche’s concepts. Heidegger does not clearlyjustify this
identification as far as I know and it is a worthwhile investigation to try to understand
(Ernst Beffler. Nietzsche-Derrido, Derrida-Nietzsche, Confrontations, 1991, Stanford University P
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why this identification should be accepted.
Heidegger had already investigated the distinction between essentia and existentia
in one of his earlier lecture courses called the Basic probtems ofphenomenology (BPP).
The basic question that Heidegger is interested in is how a being that is created, ente
creato, can have both essence and existence. If it is the case that for God, his essence
corresponds to or is his existence, how does it stand with man (Dasein)? In Being and
tirne, Heidegger had adopted the position that the substance of Dasein was existence.
Heidegger wants to clarify what is meant by actuality (actualitas). What does it mean
that something actual needs actuality in order to be yet that actuality is nothing (flot an
ens) actual?
Second, Heidegger would like to identify the origin of the distinction between
essentia and existentia. He analyzes the Aiistotelian distinction between ousia, morphe
and hyle but concludes that the distinction between essentia and existentia cannot be
simply traced back to these aristotelian distinctions. Heidegger wishes to point out that
the distinction between essentia and existentia vanishes and is destroyed at the end of
rnetaphysics. The problem is that such a distinction cannot be maintained in the wake of
the being, which we ourselves are and which Heidegger calis Dasein. If the substance of
Dasein is existence, Heidegger wants to characterize this word and concept as a
productive-intentional cornportment and flot in the way that the medieval Scholastics
understood existentia. When it cornes to the whatness or essentia of Dasein, Heidegger
again specifies that this terrn cannot apply to Dasein. Rather Dasein can be characterized
by its “whoness” flot by its “whatness”.
In the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger daims that ontology is at the same time
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theology. According to him the will to power should be thought ontologically as esse,ztia
whereas the eternal recurrence of the same should be thought theologically as existentia.
Heidegger specifies that this theology is a negative theology that should be understood in
the context of Nietzsche’s word “God is dead”. However, Heidegger ultimately does flot
explain the origin of the essentia-existentia couple claiming that its provenance must
remain obscure. No concrete argument is given either for why we should accept the
identification of wilI to power with essentia and eternal recurrence of the same with
existentia. But insofar as the will to power and the eternal recurrence of the same form a
unity, it could be surmised that in the Nietzsche lectures as well as in the BPP, the
distinction is destroyed or vanishes. This destruction is part of Heidegger ‘s project of
overcoming traditional ontology, something he was doing as early as BPP, but that gains
new urgency as Heidegger begins to see the culmination of Western metaphysics in
Nietzsche’s thought.
3.3 The forgotten Iink between eternal recurrence of the same and the concepts of
freedom and transcendence.
In the following section, I will allow myself a reflection already announced in the
first part of this essay to try to show that there is a freedom principle in Nietzsche’s
thought and that this principle is thought from the principle of the eternal recun-ence of
the same. We know that Heidegger thinks freedom in relation to the truth of Being and in
relation to atetheia. On the other hand, Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche has not
identified in the thought of eternal recurrence a way of thinking freedom. This seems to
be a valid criticism to level against Heidegger. It is possible that this notion of freedom
8$
might be unacceptable to Heidegger because it is stili dependent on the metaphysical
subject, but I believe that by exploring the notion ofeternal recurrence ofthe same, 1
will also shed some light on the way Heidegger interprets this concept.
Another criticism that I would like to raise is related to Nietzsche’s analysis of
platonic morality. Heidegger does flot deal with this Nietzschean concept explicitly but
culpability ( SchuÏd ),72 compassion and pity (Mitleid) are essential for any
interpretation ofNietzsche. Here we are touching upon moral psychology. Nietzsche
thought that this psychology had once more and particularly thanks to him become the
path to fundamental questions:
[...J that psychology shah once again 5e recogmzed as the queen ofthe
sciences, for whose service and preparation the other sciences exist. For
psychology is once again the path to the fundamental problems.
(Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyondgood and evil).
The problem is that human psychology bas a direct impact upon ontology. In fact, any
ontology that aspires to the tmth must occupy itselfwith human psychology ( understood
as the care for the soul) or at least with the onto-psychological experience that man bas
of God. This way of seeing things might ahlow us to reconcile Nietzsche and Heidegger.
But it is clear that Heidegger’ s reservations towards psychology and psychologism are in
conflict with Nietzsche’ s philosophical vision.
Nietzsche’ s analysis of human psychology is operated through a critique of the
historical phenomenon ofChristian morahity. The discussion ofnihilism is also
developed starting from this critique. Nietzsche operates what he cails a genealogy of
morals. Nietzsche’ s great struggie is to liberate humanity from the straits and bounds of
Christian morahity also described as the morality of pity in his language. The meaning of
72 In Who is Nietzsche ‘s Zarathustra, Heïdegger does deal with the concept of revenge (Rache) but lie does
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the etemal recurrence of the same is to free man from his existential culpability. Man is
guilty in virtue of the finitude of bis existence. He owes something to himself in virtue of
the fact that he possesses a future : he is, ek-sistant, but he bas to become. He is tom in
lis fundamental state of ek-sistant between the past and the future: he must in a certain
way co-exist between the two temporal extremes of the past and the future. There seem
to be two variants of Nietzsche’ thought on guilt: an ontological one and an existential
one. This articulation of Nietzsche’s thought on guilt can be seen in a polemic that
occurs between Nietzsche and St.Paul. St.Paul conceives of human weakness as ef
something that can serve democratic ends or something that can allow a new species of
nation-founding: the construction of the first universal Church of man. Men are ail
small, guilty, weak and pitiful in front of Christ. But this is precisely what unites these
men: suffering, the feeling of weakness is what bnngs them doser to one another,
unifies them and annuis the order of rank (the Nietzschean Raizgordnung ) that exists
between them.
Hath flot God made foolish the wisdom of this world ?For after that in the
wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew flot God, it pleased God by
the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. . .not many wise
men after the fiesh, flot many mighty, flot many noble are caÏted: But
God bath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and
God bath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things
which are mighty; And base things of the world, and things which are
despised, hath God chosen; yea, and things which are flot, to bring to
nought things that are: that no flesh should glory in bis presence.
(Paul,I Cori,zth. 1,20 sqq,quoted by Nietzsche in Tue Antichrist, section
45).
The polemic between Nietzsche and St.Paul is even more virulent: it plays itself out at
the level of the creation of the self. It has been asserted (Hanna Arendt in Life oftÏte
flot mention Schutd or Mitteid.
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Mmd) that St.Paul has discovered the interiority of the subject through his reflections on
the weakness of the human will (Paul calis this will proairesis). Paul rnight have
discovered human inwardness, but this inwardness is built upon a substratum of
suffering. Through suffering a depth is attained that constitutes the essence of human
conscience (in the sense of Gewisseiz). Suffering is the historical moment of the retum
to itself of self-consciousness to put it in Hegelian terms. Through the necesssary
overcoming of suffering, the hurnan self becomes self-conscious. Naturally, Nietzsche
would flot agree with this interpretation. For him, the healing of suffering and of guilt
cornes from an interpretation or re-direction of the feeling of guïlt, [al re-direction that is
effected by the ascetic priest ( Genealogy ofmorats, Third essay). It is the re-direction
of the feeling of guilt and culpability towards the inside (inwardly) that gives birth to the
bad conscience that is in tum the sub-stratum of the self. In this way, through the notions
of ontological guilt and punishment, the ascetic priest gives birth to the human self.
Nietzsche accuses St.PauI of having given birth through his heightened evaluation of
cruelty to the self as it is known in the modem world.
This heightened evaluation of cruelty in Paul goes through what Nietzsche calls
Verinnerlichung or interiorization/introjection. What we calI the spirit or the soul has
corne to be or evolved through this concept of Verinnerlichung. The inner world had
existed, according to Nietzsche, as if suspended between two membranes and this world
would have started to expand, gathering depth, breadth and height at the same time as the
inner discharge was inhibited ( Geneatogy ofrnorals, Third essay). What Nietzsche
describes in the Genealogy of morals, is the birth of conscience understood as self
consciousness ( Bewusstsein ) and as moral conscience ( Gewissen) (Genealogy of
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inorals, second essay,16).
Has Nietzsche understood welI the Paulinian-Christian concept of freedom and is
this concept really nihilistic as Nietzsche seems to affirm it? The futurality of the
Christian etemal life must be contrasted with the hic et iiunc of Nietzschean
immanentism. According to Paul, the Christian is freed for the future by the abolition of
death. The absence of death, resurrection with/in Christ, opens up a horizon that adds
another dimension to the life of immanence ( l’id-bas or Diesseitigkeit). But this is flot
necessarily nihilistic as Nietzsche seems to affirm it. The Christian can affirm that he is
allowed to live his life of immanence more ful]y since he does not have to worry about
the Sein-zum-Tode of his Dasein.
Nietzschean freedom is thought in part if not thoroughly in opposition to the
Chrjstjan concept of freedom but this freedom is also similar to the Chnstian one. What
is common to both these notions of freedom is the idea of transfiguration-transformation.
Etemat recurrence is a repetition of the immanence that is lived ici-bas but through this
repetition a transfiguration is operated. Christian freedom is eÏaborated only through the
idea of a transfiguration of the immanent ici-bas and not through a repetition of the
Nietzschean instant73. Seen from this perspective, can one say that the eternal recurrence
of the sanie is metaphysical and thus nihilistic (this time in ternis of Heidegger’s
understanding of the term nihilistic) as Heidegger seems to affirm it in Was heisst De,zken
(the conference course) since it is stiil dependant upon the notions of subject and will?
What recurs is the expenences of a subject and this subject must witl the retum. How
must a notion of freedom be constituted so that it is flot metaphysical in the second
(for the Christian-Paulinïan concept of freedom see Bultmann, New Testament Theotogy, VoI.1, Part 2,
Section D and especially sub-section 40)
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Heidegger’s understanding ofthis term? According to us, Heidegger’s notion ofBeing
and alethela are insufficient to think through human freedom. It is well-known that
Heidegger wrote abundantly on freedom as the writings Vom Wesen der rnenschlichen
Freiheit (On the essence ofhumanfreedom) and Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (On the
essence oftruth) testify. Yet, we do flot find that these writings provide a satisfactory
approach to the concept offreedom. We believe freedom must be thought through and
starting from man without falling back on the notions ofmetaphysical subject and wilÏ.
Heidegger himself seems to have criticized Nietzsche for bis immanentism. This
immanentism that seems to instail the will to power as technological will-to-will is
elaborated starting ftom the concepts of life and position of values. It is flot clear
whether Heidegger had fully overcome this Nietzschean immanentism as early as Being
and Time (since the philosophy expounded in that text sought to preserve certain
transcendental moments) but it is clear that the rest of his philosophy after the thirties (
and especially in the Beitraege zur Philosophie) is an effort to recover a transcendence
that, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche’ s philosophy had partially annihilated. As an
excellent Heidegger commentator bas put it
This alone suggested that it was Christianity once again that challenged
the thought ofthis man (Heidegger, P.C.) and heÏd him in suspense, it
was once again the old transcendence and flot the modem worldliness
(Diesseitigkeit) that spoke through him74.
Thus, value-positing is deflnitely criticized by Heidegger in Nietzsche’s word God is
dead when Heidegger asserts that thinking in values does flot let Being be (das Denken
‘ Gadamer Hans-Georg. Heidegger ‘s wavs: Bein. Spïrit.God
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im Werte laesst nicht das Sein sein). The concept of life ( Leben ) is highly problematic
and seems to succumb to Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche’s biologism. This is flot
clearly indicated in Heidegger but it must be retained that the openneness of Being and
truth as atetheia elaborate a Heideggerian transcendence. There is no doubt that
Nietzschean immanence or immanentism is aimed at by Heidegger when he criticizes the
will-to-wiII, the Gesteti and the Bestand. The Being of technology is already articulated
by Nietzsche according to Heidegger and this Being is conceptualized starting solely
from immanence. As a brilliant Heidegger commentator has put it:
.as Heidegger makes Nietzsche’s words his own, he substitutes , within
the ‘history of Being ‘the contemporary technological moment for the
Nietzschean moment (...) the evidence for it is to be found throughout
Heidegger’s texts on Nietzsche: they speak formally about Nietzsche but
materially about technology as the closing field in the history of presence,
as ‘the release of being into machination’, but they do so with the hetp of
the vocabulary taken from Nietzsche75.
(Schuerrnann Reiner, Heidegger on Reing and acting : from principles to
anarcÏzy, p.1 82.)
Only what can be disposed of as the standing reserve (Restand), what can be encircled,
circumscribed and manipulated becomes visible in our Wettbild. Everything is reduced
to a resource and it is only as manipulable resource that everything becomes visible and
worthy of interest. Man is a resource, a human resource, almost on the same level as
petrol and electricity76.
We can perhaps affirm that Heidegger does not give an accurate portrayal of
Nietzsche’s philosophy as such. But he might be right in seeing in him the completion of
metaphysics. The fact that Heidegger does flot completely do justice to Nietzsche’s
Heidegger also develops his vocabulary about technology through the intercourse with Ernst Juenger’s
works (DerArbeiter, Die totale Mobitmachung) which he was reading with some ofhis students in the
early 30’s at Freiburg University. Sec below p.97
Sec Overcoming metaphysics. Man is the supreme resource because he is the most malleable one
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phulosophy lias been clearly brouglit out in the interpretation that lias been proposed by
Wolfgang Mueller-Lauter. According to Mueller-Lauter77, Heidegger essentializes
Nietzsche’s thought of the will to power. In lis opinion there are wills to power. Mueller
Lauter’s reading is very interesting and along with Gilles Deleuze lie lias perhaps
provided the most important critiques to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche. The
Deleuzian and Mueller-Lauterian readings are characterized by different interpretations
of the vi1I to power. Heidegger sees in the will to power the culmination of metaphysical
rationality. This culmination happens in two different ways: on the one side from Plato
and on the other side from Hegel.
Mueller-Lauter’s position is that in Nietzsche the metaphysical wiIl-to-will sees
itself and posits itself as a total wilI but that at the same time this will is referred to a
multiplicity of wills to power that decenter the will to power as a purely metaphysical
principle. Thus, metaphysics destroys itself from within metaphysics in Nietzsche’s
thought according to Mueller-Lauter. But this thesis does not take into account what
makes Heidegger’s reading so interesting: the idea of a continuity in metaphysics from
Hegel to Nietzsche which I have argued for in the second part of my paper, the inversion
of absolute subjectivity (Hegel) into the consummate subjectivity of the will to power
(Nietzsche). An additional aspect of Heidegger’s Nietzsche reading is the continuity
established from Plato to Nietzsche . This continuity is shown by Heidegger’s convincing
argument that in the history of Being Plato’s ideas are transformed into Nietzsche’s
values.
Thus Heidegger’s reading is brilliant because it inserts Nietzsche’s thought in the
In Nietzsche ‘s phitosophy of contradictions and the contradictions of lus phitosophy, for full reference
see Bibliography.
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context of the Western tradition which according to Heidegger is cornpleted by
Nietzsche. However, his interpretation does not read Nietzsche only from within
Nietzsche’s text and conceptuality as Mueller-Lauter seerns to do at times.
3.4 Critique of Heideger’s readin% of Nietzsche
It is this my opinion that the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same
represents an effort by Nietzsche to think through human freedom. But we know that
Nietzsche did not think much of the freedom of the will because it depended on a
phulosophy of the will, a philosophy which in his opinion had no other goal but to chain
and entrap man by making him responsible for moral acts. I believe however that any
philosophy must corne to terms with human freedom at the peril of losing its
philosophical dignity if it does not do so. I thus allow myseif a reflection already alluded
to in the first part of this essay in order to try to show that there is a principle of freedorn
and transcendence in Nietzsche’s thought and that this principle is elaborated starting
from the concept of the eternal recurrence of the same. The concept of the etemal
recurrence of the sarne represents a dialectic of contigence and necessity.
The thought of eternal recurrence allows each individual that is capable of this
thought to understand his particular life as part of a greater totality, a cosmos (a regnum
and an ordo). Every mornent frorn which the life of an individual is constituted,
including the most difficult moments (and perhaps these moments more than the others
since they lead to the thought of eternal recurrence by producing the experience of
nihilism) are felt and understood as necessary parts of the individual’s self, of what he is
and what he has become. The experiences of a subject return, recur and this occurs in
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part in a manner independent from the volition of the subject: the stream of experiences
retums. But there is also a subjective component that is associated to the thought of
eternal recurrence, the «also wollte Ich es » (thus I willed it) that reverses the temporal
flow and its «es war» (it was). A subjective will wants to reverse the experiences that
contingently occur for the subject of this will and this will wills the necessity of these
experiences by willing its return. But this is only possible if there is an identity between
these two movements (the contingent current (flow) of experiences and the necessary
and conscious will that reverses the contingency of the flow of expetiences). In order to
think these two movements together we cannot think them as essentially different one
from another. There is a pre-supposed identity from the start between these two
movements.
My interpretation of a concept of freedom in Nïetzsche’s philosophy is not
conventional from a Nietzschean point of view and perhaps it would have been rejected
by Nietzsche himself. I wilÏ spend quite a bit of time on quotes in the Nietzschean corpus
that could validate my interpretatïon but I wilI also analyse the most striking texts that go
against my interpretation. In my opinion the Nietzschean “system”, if it is possible to
speak in this fashion, does not possess a principle of transcendence. This might be
perhaps very conscious and intended on Nietzsche’s part, but it remains a great apona of
his system and he can legitimately be criticized from this perspective. By interpreting a
dialectic «into » his concept of etemal recurrence of the same, I hope to be able to
restore a form of transcendence necessary to balance out Nietzsche’s thought. However,
this transcendence is not something that I supenmposed on the Nietzschean conceptuality
and text: the transcendence I am referring to exists implicitly in these loci. It remains to
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be resolved whether Nietzsche’s mens auctoris, his intended meaning on the question of
transcendence, is relevant to this issue or not. With Gadamer and Heidegger, we might
want to say that the Sache of Nietzsche’s text speaks of transcendence even if Nietzsche
neyer had any intentions to do so.
I would now like to proceed to an analysis of certain key-passages that elaborate
and explain Nietzsche’s concept of eternal recurrence of the same. A first passage that is
important is the following:
the ideal of the most world-approving, exuberant and vivacious man,
who has flot only learnt to compromise and arrange with that which was
and is, but wishes to have it again as it was and is, for ail etemity,
insatiably calling out da capo, flot only to himseif, but to the whole piece
and play; flot only to the play but actually to him who requires the play
-and makes it necessary; because he aiways requires himseif anew -and
makes himself flecessary.- -What? And this would not be -circulus vitiosus
deus?
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond good and cvii, 56.
It must be noted that if word «dialectic » is flot mentioned, it is because Nietzsche
possesses a negative evaluation of diaiectic, mentions it only in a critical fashion and
associates it to decadence and socratism. However the concept of necessity (necessary)
is mentioned here. The ideai of the affirming man is closely linked to the concept of the
Uebermensch developed in Thus spoke Zarathustra.
The next important mention of etemal recurrence is made by Nietzsche in his
magnum opus, Thus spoke Zarathustra (The vision and the nddie):
«Observe, » continued I, «this Moment ! » From the gateway, This
Moment, there runneth a long etemal lane backwards: behind us lieth an
etemity. Must flot whatever can run its course of ail things, have already
run along that lane? Must flot whatever can happen of ail things have
already happened, resulted and gone by ? And if everything have already
existed, what thinkest thou, dwarf, of this Moment? Must not this
gateway also —have already existed? And are flot ail things closely bound
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together in such wise that this Moment draweth ail coming things after it?
Consequently
-
- itself also? For whatever can mn its course of ail things,
also in this long lane outward —must it once more run!- And this slow
spider which creepeth in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and
thou and lin this gateway whispeiing together, whispering of etemal
things —must we not ail have aiready existed? -And must we flot retum
and run in that other iane out before us, that long strange lane —must we
not eternally retum ? » -
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus spoke Zarathustra, The vision and the riddle.
Here, Nietzsche seems to want to reconstruct the experience of recurrence in a
scientific manner (reference to the knot of causality), although this is implicit. In a
similar way, I have reproduced in the first part of my essay the quasi-scientific
reconstruction that Heidegger gives of etemai recurrence. In his Nachtass Nietzsche
seeks to give scientific arguments for his thesis of the eternal recurrence of the same. This
mainly in the group of aphorisms known under the title WiÏl to power and that were put
together by Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche. (Sections 1062, 1063, 1064, 1066)
Another place where Nietzsche makes an allusion to the etemai recurrence of the
same is in the section called The convalescent in Zarathustra. Nietzsche writes:
Everything goeth, everything retumeth; etemally rolleth the wheel of
existence [Being]. Everythi ng dieth, everything blossometh forth again;
etemally runneth on the year of existence [BeingJ. Everything breaketh,
everything is integrated anew; etemaliy buildeth itseif the same house of
existence [Being]. All things separate, ah things again greet one another;
etemally true to itself remaineth the ring of existence [BeingJ. Every
moment beginneth existence [Being], around every ‘Here’ rolleth the bail
‘There’. The middle is everywhere, crooked is the path of etemity.
TÏzus spoke Zarathustra, The convalescent, second section.
It is interesting to note that the ianguage used in this text is purely poetical and
mythological with references to the wheei, the ring and the house of Being. Nietzsche
seems to be articuiating a mystic vision where ‘Here’ and ‘There’ magically and fluidly
inter-mingle. There is ciearly no attempt to ground etemal recurrence scientifically in
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this passage as is the case with some of the passages in Zarathustra. Another important
passage can also be found in The convalescent:
“Etemally he retumeth, the man of whom thou art weary, the smail
man”-so yawned my sadness, and dragged its foot and could not go to
sleep. . . -“Ah, man retumeth etemally ! The small man retumeth eternally
!“ Naked had I once seen both of them, the greatest man and the smallest
man: ail too like one another-ali too human, even the greatest man ! Ail
too small, even the greatest man ! -that was my disgust at man ! And the
eternal retum also of the smalIest man ! That was my disgust at all
existence.
Thus spoke Zarathustra, The convalescent, second section.
This passage is important because it poses the problem of the retum of the ‘small’ man
which, can also be read as the “iast man”. The retum of the Iast man poses the problem
of the transformative nature of the thought of etemal recurrence. If it is the case that
every man who experiences the eternal recurrence is transformed through this experience,
then isn’t it paradoxical to ciaim that the last or smalÏ man returns also, integraiiy?
Another passage in The convalescent goes as follows:
For behold, O Zarathustra ! For thy new lays there are needed new lyres.
Sing and bubbie over, O Zarathustra, heal thy soul with new lays: that
thou may bearest thy great fate, which bath flot yet been any one’s fate
For thine animais know it weil, O Zarathustra, who thou art and must
become: behoid, thou art the teacÏzer ofthe eternat retuni, -that is now
thy fate ! That thou must be the first to teach this teaching-how could this
great fate not be thy greatest danger and infirmity. Behold, we know
what thou teachest: that ail things etemally retum, and ourselves with
them, and that we have already existed times without number, and ail
things with us. Thou teachest that there is a great year of Becoming, a
prodigy of a great year; it must, iike a sand-glass, ever tum up anew,
that it may anew run down and run out:- So that ah those years are iike
one another in the greatest and also in the smallest. And if thou wouldst
now die, O Zarathustra, behold, we know also how thou wouldst then
speak to thyself:-but thine animais beseech thee not to die yet! Thou
wouldst speak and without trembling, buoyant rather with bhiss, for a
great weight and worry would be taken from thee, thou patientest one!
‘Now do I die and disappear’ wouldst thou say, and in a moment I am
nothing. Souls are as mortal as bodies. But the plexus of causes returneth
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in which I am intertwined,-it wiII again create me! I myseif pertain to the
causes of the eternal retum. I corne again with this sun, with this earth,
with this eagle, with this serpent-not to a new life, or a better life, or a
similar life: I corne again etemally to this identical and selfsarne life, in
its greatest and its smatiest to teach again the eternal return of ail things,
To speak again the word of the great noontide of earth and man to
announce again to man the Superman.
Thus spoke Zarathustra, The convalescent, second section.
What is important in this passage is the acknowledgement by Zarathustra’s animais that
he is the teacher of the etemal recurrence. This recognition is essential. Zarathustra is by
essence the teacher of the etemal recurrence of the same and the announcer of the coming
of the Ueberinensch. This passage seerns to imply that there is no transformation or
transcendence that occurs through the thought of recurrence since we corne again “not to
a new life, or a better life, or a similar life, . . . but to this identical and selfsame life”.
II is interesting to note that it is the animais that are speaking in this passage and not
Zarathustra himseif. Another important passage on etemai recurrence can be found in the
Gay science, aphorism 341, where Nietzsche writes:
The greatest stress. How, if some day or night a demon were to sneak
after you into your Ïoneliest loneiiness and say to you, “This life as you
now live it and have lived it, you wiII have to live once more and
innumerable times more; and there wiIl be nothing new in it, but every
pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything
imrneasurabiy small or great in your life must retum to you-all in the same
succession and sequence-even this spider and this moonlight between the
trees, and even this moment and I myseif. The etemal hourglass of
existence is tumed over and over, and you with it, a dust grain of dust.”
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the
demon who spoke thus? Or did you once experience a tremendous
moment when you would have answered him, “You are a god, and neyer
have I heard anything more godly.” If this thought were to gain
possession of you, it would change you, as you are, or perhaps cmsh
you. The question in each and every thing. “Do you want this once more
and innumerable times more ?“ would weigh upon your actions as the
greatest stress. Or how well disposed wouid you have to become to
yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate
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etemal confirmation and seai?
Gay Science, Section 341.
This passage that has the form of a fable or a myth, is similar to the one in Zarathustra in
which Zarathustra must confront a dwarf that he carnes on his shouiders. But in
Zarathustra, the confrontation with the dwarf is interrupted by Zarathustra’s recollection
of a scene from his youth. Again this passage seems to speak against a transformative
nature of the doctrine of recurrence. On the one hand “This life as you now live it and
have iived it, you wiii have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there
will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and
everything immeasurably small or great in your life must retum to you- ail in the same
succession and sequence-even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even
this moment and I myseif...” but on the other hand “If this thought were to gain
possession of you, it wouid change you, as you are, or perhaps crush you “, so it does
seem like the thought of recurrence produces a change in the one who is capable of
thinking it and expenencing it.
Another place in the Nietzschean corpus that elaborates on the concept of etemal
recurrence can be found in the text of the aphorisms anthoiogized under the titie Wilt to
power (WP from now on). Aphorisms 1053 to 105$ (in the Kaufmann translation that is
based on the 1901 edition) describe the etemai recurrence as a prophecy and a cuitural
and political principle. According to Nietzsche, it is the “great cultivating idea”
(1056.1884). It is a pessimist teaching and a mode of thinking that is close to ecstatic
nihiiism (1055.1885) that aiiows the destruction of decadent and degenerate races. The
doctrine of recurrence permits the implantation in what is degenerate and wants to die, a
nostaigia for the end. Nietzsche sometimes compares the doctrine of etemal recurrence
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to a hammer that could confront Europe and that could determine if its will “wills”
destruction: “Prevention of reduction to mediocrity. Rather destruction !“(1054. 1885-
1886). It is clear that for Nietzsche, on top of being a moral and scientific (and perhaps
ontological and metaphysical) teaching, the etemal recurrence of the same also possesses
a political aspect: “Foundation of an oligarchy above peoples and their interests:
education to a universally human politics. Counter-part oflesuitism.”( 1057. 1883-
1888)
I reject in principle attempts to prove eternal recurrence in a scientific manner,
because according to me, Nietzsche attempts to prove etemal recurrence by having
recourse to the erroneous argument according to which a cosmic state of equilibrium is
unattainable. But, this unattainability of a state of equilibrium is far from being a
certainty of actual astrophysics. For this science, the universe is a problem (it is either
expanding or contracting, but it could also be at rest) and it is flot clear whether in
principle a state of equilibrium could flot be reached. My second reason for rejecting the
scientific proofs of recurrence are related to the first. When Nietzsche attempts to prove
scientifically the etemal recurrence of the same, he makes affirmations (such as that
state of equilibrium of the universe or the finite and infinite character of a force ) about
physical nature or matter.
However, the ontological nature of the universe is a domain of expertise about
which philosophers cannot, for the most part, express themselves in a credible manner
(this does not exclude the clarification and reflexion on the nature of modem
scientific discoveries but what I am claiming is that philosophers can no longer
« discover» the nature of their theories without referring to the empirical data and the
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theories elaborated by modem physics) faced with the «progress » that has been
achieved in the domains of the natural sciences and in modem technology.78 Nietzsche
starts from a hypothesis about the structure of human experience and then presupposes
that he can find proofs for this hypothesis in the physical nature of the universe. It is this
method of proceeding that I cal! «erroneous ». It’s a fact, however, that Nietzsche had
flot invented the thought of etemal recurrence. This thought existed already in a
primitive way in Heraclitus (in a form called ekpyhrrosis) and in Auguste Blanqui. What
is more the hypothesis of etemal recurrence is rumored to have been discussed in
contemporary scientific milieux surrounding Nietzsche or immediately following after
him (See book by Abel Rey, La physique et l’éternel retour,1928).
There seems to be a contradiction between freedom and the will to power.
However, it is possible to show that the wiII to power is not necessarily opposed to the
concept of freedom. Nietzsche affirms (in the Genealogy ofrnoraÏs) that what he calls
the will to power is another way to name «the feeling of augmenting power ». It is clear
that for Nietzsche there will occur an augmentation in freedom only if there is an
augmentation in power. Contrary to this, we would like to affirm that there is an
augmentation in power only if there is an augmentation in freedom. According to our
interpretation, the will only becomes stronger if it wills the etemal recurrence and this
same will only wills the etemal recurrence if itfrees itself to will a greater power as will
to power. Freedom and power would be at least co-originary according to this
78 One could argue that at Nietzsche’s epoch, philosophers stiil dabbled in natural science and that his
ventures and speculation in the natural-scientific domain are not out of place. But in my opinion this
argument does not really stand in the context of an attempt to prove eternal recurrence scientifically.
Eternal recurrence of the same would have to be valid like a physical law like Newton’s laws of motion or
Einstein’s relativity but it is clear that Nietzsche wants eternal recurrence to be a thought or a human
experience first and that the attempts to prove recurrence corne afterwards. It is for this reason that bis
attempts to prove eternal recurrence of the same scientifically are not convincing.
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conception. The wilI thus has to free itself in order to wilI the eternal recurrence of the
wiIl to power and it is only through this liberation that will attains its essence and that the
wilI to power is united to eternal recurrence.
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CONCLUSION
Nietzsche’s greatness is to have liberated metaphysics from its submission to
morality. By unhinging the link established by Plato between the metaphysical object
and the moral object, Nietzsche historicizes both morality and metaphysics. If for
Nietzsche the withdrawal of faith in morality is done out of morality (Daybreak, Preface,
Section 4), it does nonetheless follow that his critique dissolves both domains: the
metaphysical and moral. If Nietzsche detaches the metaphysical from the moral, lie only
does this to re-establish the priority of the moral over the metaphysical. This movement
of detachment and re-founding is both antagonistic and dialectical. This dialectic,
without being formaI, is important. This is the case because it is our thesis that the
Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche depends on the fact that Heidegger sees in Nietzsche a
great dialectician (as well as a great metaphysician). Heidegger identifies dialectical
connections in Nietzsche’s metaphysics, mainly between the will to power and eternal
recurrence, as we have attempted to show. However, the inversion of Platonism is
accomplished through the evacuation of the platonic dialectic between being and
becoming and good and evil. We take issue with Heidegger ‘s daim that Nietzsche’s
inversion of Platonism through the sole affirmation of becoming is nothing but an
entrenchment in Platonism. Nietzsche does flot oniy affirm the precedence of becoming
over being, lie also “deconstructs” or “destroys” the difference between being and
becoming as a careful reading of the Histoiy of an error shows ([“]The true world -- we
have abolished. What world lias remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the
true world we have atso abolished tue apparent one.[%])
Nietzsche explicitly pronounced himself against the dialectic and the dialectical
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method as a form of Socratism and of decadence. As we have argued earlier, we agree
that there is something of a dialectic between the moral domain and the metaphysical
domain in Nietzsche’s thought but this is flot where Heidegger has located his
interpretation of the dialectic in Nietzsche’s thought. Instead Heidegger has dialecticized
the thoughts of the wilI to power and eternal recurrence and has reduced them to a unity
and a totality. Heidegger’s dialectization of Nietzsche’s thought must be understood as a
strategy to reduce Nietzsche to Regel (and to Plato) and to step beyond those thinkers.
When Heidegger daims that Nietzsche inverts and completes the unconditioned and
absolute subjectivity of German Idealism (and of Regel), this reading is motivated by an
attempt to read a continuity between Nietzsche and Hegel, only to better overcome what
Heidegger believes to be their common, radical subjectivism. But this unbounded
subjectivism also corresponds to an epoch in Heidegger’s history of Being, the epoch of
the Gesteil. It has been argued (Reiner Schuermann) that the rubrics of Nietzsche’s
thought singled out by Heidegger (wiII to power, eternal recurrence of the same,
Uebermensch, nihilism, justice) are indeed technological categories and that, although
formally speaking of Nietzsche, materially they articulate Heidegger’s views on the
essence of modem technology. On the whole we agree with this assessment. We
believe, however, that Heidegger’s appropriation of the Nietzschean language for his
own purposes bas left out important elements of Nietzsche’s thought on freedom and
transcendence. On the one hand the etemal recurrence of the will to power cannot be
conceived without a freedom to wiII this recurrence. Thus on this reading freedom would
be the middle term between will to power and etemal recurrence. On the other hand for
Nietzsche, transcendence is flot completely separated from immanence but is achieved
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through repetition and transfiguration.
Thus, the Heideggerean move of dialecticizing Nietzsche’s thought is flot in itself
convincing when it attempts to interpret Nietzsche’s philosophy, but it does make sense
from the perspective of Heidegger’s own phulosophical project. Nietzsche was the great
antipode of Hegel. But Nietzsche cannot be correctly reduced to Hegel if we take into
account that in Hegel the metaphysical and the moral object are stili powerfully
intertwined. For Hegel, knowing us stiil willing the good, and Spirit is only a higher
rationality that has integrated in a deeper way both the practical and the pure reason of
Kant. Nietzsche has transcended this Hegelian position and knowing for him is flot
knowledge of the good or knowledge of the true but is knowledge “beyond good and
evil”.
Nietzsche is also Plato’s great antipode. But if Heidegger’s thesis with respect to
Nietzsche’s inverted Platonism were correct, we would have to find in Nietzsche’s
thought an inverted dialectic: one that argues from being to becoming instead of from
becoming to being. Instead of this, Nietzsche “destroys” and “deconstructs” the binary
poles of the dialectic and thus unhinges the possibïlity of the dialectic itself. It may be
argued that Nietzsche attempts to preserve one pote of the dialectic, that of becoming
over and above the other pole and in this sense he merely inverts Platonism as Heidegger
has attempted to show. There are elements of this in Nietzsche’s thought when he daims
that only a world of becoming exists and that the world of being, as true world, is a
fabrication, but we believe that ultimately Nietzsche is flot naïve enough to merely
replace being with becoming. As shown in the History ofan error when the true world
(being) disappears, the apparent world (becoming) disappears as well. In fact, as argued
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by Heidegger, Nietzsche attempts to find a new language to replace that of being and
becoming because these distinctions empty themselves of content at the end of
metaphysics. The fact that the will to power and the eternal recurrence of the same
cannot easily be identified with being or becoming but that they rather oscillate between
these two concepts is a proof of this assertion. The unity of the will to power and the
eternal recurrence depends on their retating to being and becoming (and to the
pennanentization of becoming), akematively in similar and then in differentiated ways.
Thus on the whole, even though it is a brilliant attempt to systematize Nietzsche,
we must reject the ultimate conclusions of Heidegger’s engagement witb Nietzscbe.
Heidegger bas flot so much provided us with an accurate picture of Nietzsche as he bas
used Nietzsche to find bis own vocabulary and articulate bis own great concepts of
Gestett, the essence of modem technology and the history of Beïng.
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